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I. INTRODUCTION 
Tribal court dockets across the country have been growing 
steadily, and tribal courts are becoming an important part of the 
judicial fabric of the United States.1  To acknowledge this reality, 
state courts and legislatures across the United States have begun to 
address the important issues of how and whether to recognize 
tribal court judgments in state courts.2  The Minnesota Supreme 
Court adopted a rule that took effect in January of 2004 that 
 
 1. Sandra Day O’Connor, Lessons from the Third Sovereign: Indian Tribal Courts, 
33 TULSA L.J. 1, 2 (1997). 
 2. See, e.g., N.C. GEN. STAT. § 1E-1(a) (2003) (“The courts of this State shall 
give full faith and credit to a judgment, decree, or order signed by a judicial 
officer of the Eastern Band of Cherokee Indians and filed in the Cherokee Tribal 
Court to the same extent as is given a judgment, decree, or order of another state . 
. . provided that the judgments, decrees, and orders of the courts of this State are 
given full faith and credit by the Tribal Court of the Eastern Band of Cherokee 
Indians.”); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 1-1-25 (Michie 2003) (stating “[n]o order or 
judgment of a tribal court in the state of South Dakota may be recognized as a 
matter of comity in the state courts of South Dakota, except under [certain] terms 
and conditions” established by clear and convincing evidence); 17B ARIZ. REV. 
STAT. TRIBAL CT. CIV. J. R. 1-7 (establishing full faith and credit for tribal courts, 
unless objection filed); MICH. CT. R. 2.615 (establishing that judgments and orders 
of tribal courts granting reciprocity to Michigan courts were presumed valid and 
given full faith and credit unless objecting party proves one of enumerated 
factors); OKLA. DIST. CT. R. 30(b) (adopted 1994) (granting full faith and credit 
where tribal courts reciprocate); WASH. SUPER. CT. CIV. R. 82.5(c) (granting full 
faith and credit to tribal court orders, judgments, and decrees as long as there is 
reciprocity, due process, and jurisdiction); WIS. STAT. § 806.245 (2003) 
(proclaiming full faith and credit for tribal courts, but setting forth a list of 
requirements that look more like comity); WYO. STAT. ANN. § 5-1-111 (Michie 
2002) (granting full faith and credit to the judicial records, orders, and judgments 
of the courts of the Eastern Shoshone and Northern Arapaho Tribes of the Wind 
River Reservation, unless one of the four enumerated requirements is not met); 
John v. Baker, 982 P.2d 738, 763 (Alaska 1999) (holding that Alaska courts should, 
as a general rule, “respect tribal court decisions under the comity doctrine”); 
Wippert v. Blackfeet Tribe of the Blackfeet Indian Reservation, 859 P.2d 420, 429 
(Mont. 1993) (upholding comity for tribal court judgments). 
2
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provides guidelines for the recognition and enforcement of tribal 
court orders and judgments.3  The Minnesota Supreme Court Rule 
on the Recognition and Enforcement of Tribal Court Orders and 
Judgments (“Minnesota Rule”) followed closely on the heels of a 
similar rule by the Arizona Supreme Court.4  Though the 
Minnesota and Arizona rules are close in time, they staked out 
quite different approaches.5  The Arizona Supreme Court Rules of 
Procedure for the Recognition of Tribal Court Civil Judgments 
(“Arizona Rules”) reflect tremendous respect for tribal courts and 
provide clear guidance to lower state court judges as to how to 
handle tribal court judgments.6  The Minnesota Rule, in contrast, 
adopts a much more tentative stance toward tribal court orders and 
judgments and provides little or no guidance to state court judges 
as to whether to recognize a tribal judgment.7 
All of the recent activity in state courts and legislatures, 
together with the important policy issues underlying these 
questions, has fueled voluminous academic commentary.8  The 
 
 3. MINN. R. GEN. PRACT. 10. 
 4. See 17B ARIZ. REV. STAT. TRIBAL CT. CIV. J. R. 1-7. 
 5. Compare 17B ARIZ. REV. STAT. TRIBAL CT. CIV. J. R. 1-7 with MINN. R. GEN. 
PRACT. 10. 
 6. See 17B ARIZ. REV. STAT. TRIBAL CT. CIV. J. R. 1-7. 
 7. See MINN. R. GEN. PRACT. 10. 
 8. Robert N. Clinton et al., Dispute Resolution in Indian Country: Does 
Abstention Make the Heart Grow Fonder?, 71 N.D. L. REV. 541, 554-55 (1995); Robert 
N. Clinton, Redressing the Legacy of Conquest: A Vision Quest for a Decolonized Federal 
Indian Law, 46 ARK. L. REV. 77 (1993); Robert N. Clinton, Tribal Courts and the 
Federal Union, 26 WILLAMETTE L. REV. 841 (1990); P.S. Deloria & Robert Laurence, 
Negotiating Tribal-State Full Faith and Credit Agreements: The Topology of the Negotiation 
and the Merits of the Question, 28 GA. L. REV. 365 (1994); Karla Engle, Red Fox v. 
Hettich: Does South Dakota’s Comity Statute Foster Unwarranted State Court Intrusion into 
Tribal Jurisdictional Authority Over Civil Disputes?, 38 S.D. L. REV. 706 (1993); Daina 
B. Garonzik, Full Reciprocity for Tribal Courts from a Federal Courts Perspective: A 
Proposed Amendment to the Full Faith and Credit Act, 45 EMORY L.J. 723 (1996); Robert 
Laurence, Symmetry and Asymmetry in Federal Indian Law, 42 ARIZ. L. REV. 861 
(2000); Richard E. Ransom et al., Recognizing and Enforcing State and Tribal 
Judgments: A Roundtable Discussion of Law, Policy, and Practice, 18 AM. INDIAN L. REV. 
239 (1993); see Robert Laurence, The Role, if Any, for the Federal Courts in the Cross-
Boundary Enforcement of Federal, State and Tribal Money Judgments, 35 TULSA L.J. 1 
(1999); Robert Laurence, The Off-Reservation Garnishment of an On-Reservation Debt 
and Related Issues in the Cross-Boundary Enforcement of Money Judgments, 22 AM. INDIAN 
L. REV. 355 (1998); Robert Laurence, The Convergence of Cross-Boundary Enforcement 
Theories in American Indian Law: An Attempt to Reconcile Full Faith and Credit, Comity 
and Asymmetry, 18 QUINNIPIAC L. REV. 115 (1998); Robert Laurence, The Bothersome 
Need for Asymmetry in Any Federally Dictated Rule of Recognition for the Enforcement of 
Money Judgments Across Indian Reservation Boundaries, 27 CONN. L. REV. 979 (1995); 
Robert Laurence, Dominant-Society Law and Tribal Court Adjudication, 25 N.M. L. 
3
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academic literature includes several articles that fill a useful niche 
in describing the development of the law in the specific context of 
rules for the recognition of tribal court judgments.9  This article 
seeks to add to the existing scholarship within that niche by 
describing the development of the Arizona and Minnesota rules.  
In addition, it seeks to offer a substantive critique of the Minnesota 
Rule and some suggestions as to the broader lessons that can be 
learned from the process. 
This article will critically evaluate the Minnesota Rule by 
comparing and contrasting its development, as well as its 
substantive content, with the new Arizona Rules.  Part II of this 
article will describe the Minnesota Rule and compare it to the 
Arizona Rules that shortly preceded it.10  Part III will describe the 
rulemaking processes that produced the Minnesota and Arizona 
Rules and seek to provide insight into how Minnesota reached such 
a markedly different result than Arizona.11  Part III will also mine 
the insights from these processes and from other sources to offer 
some explanation as to why the Arizona Supreme Court embraced 
tribal courts respectfully while the Minnesota Supreme Court 
addressed tribal courts cautiously.12  Part IV will conclude by 
encouraging the Minnesota Supreme Court to view its new rule as a 
cautious first step and urging the court to consider a re-
 
REV. 1 (1995); Robert Laurence, The Enforcement of Judgments Across Indian 
Reservation Boundaries: Full Faith and Credit, Comity, and the Indian Civil Rights Act, 69 
OR. L. REV. 589 (1990); Stacy L. Leeds, Cross Jurisdictional Recognition and 
Enforcement of Judgments: A Tribal Court Perspective, 76 N.D. L. REV. 311  (2000); Fred 
L. Ragsdale, Jr., Problems in the Application of Full Faith and Credit for Indian Tribes, 7 
N.M. L. REV. 133 (1977); Melissa L. Tatum, A Jurisdictional Quandary: Challenges 
Facing Tribal Governments in Implementing the Full Faith and Credit Provisions of the 
Violence Against Women Acts, 90 KY. L.J. 123, 138-39, 183-84 (2002); William V. 
Vetter, Of Tribal Courts and “Territories”: Is Full Faith and Credit Required?, 23 CAL. W. 
L. REV. 219 (1987). 
 9. See Michael F. Cavanaugh, Michigan’s Story: State and Tribal Court Try to Do 
the Right Thing, 76 U. DET. MERCY L. REV. 709 (1999) (discussing Michigan’s 
adoption of rule for the recognition of tribal court judgments); Ralph J. Erickstad 
& James Ganje, Tribal and State Courts – A New Beginning, 71 N.D. L. REV. 569, 579-
80 (1995) (describing adoption of North Dakota rule for recognition of tribal 
judgments); Darby L. Hoggatt, Comment, The Wyoming Tribal Full Faith and Credit 
Act: Enforcing Tribal Judgments and Protecting Tribal Sovereignty, 30 LAND & WATER L. 
REV. 531 (1995); see also James A. Bransky & Hon. Garfield W. Hood, The 
State/Tribal Court Forum: Moving Tribal and State Courts from Conflict to Cooperation, 72 
MICH. B.J. 420, 420 (1993). 
10.    See infra Part II. 
 11. See infra Part III. 
 12. See infra Part III. 
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examination of the question after appropriate experience has 
developed from which to evaluate the current rule.13 
 
II. THE NEW RULES FOR RECOGNITION OF TRIBAL COURT 
JUDGMENTS 
The differing approaches to the question of the recognition of 
tribal court judgments reflect a wide spectrum.14  On one end of 
the spectrum are those states that are highly respectful of tribal 
court civil judgments.  Courts in Idaho and New Mexico,15 for 
example, accord tribal courts “full faith and credit” under federal 
law, the same level of respect that they accord to other state 
courts.16  Courts in several other states, such as Oklahoma,17 assert 
“full faith and credit” for tribal courts, but go on to define that 
phrase in a particular manner that affords slightly less respect to 
judgments of tribal courts than judgments of state courts.18  Some 
states eschew the “full faith and credit” language, but direct lower 
courts to exercise “comity” in determining whether to recognize 
tribal court judgments.19 
Most states fall within one of these three bands along the 
 
 13. See infra Part III. 
 14. See Leeds, supra note 8, at 331-46 (outlining a thorough survey of how 
state courts have addressed these questions). 
 15. See id. at 332 (stating that Idaho and New Mexico are the only states to 
include tribes in the federal Full Faith and Credit Act’s definition of “territory,” 
thus giving full faith and credit recognition to tribal courts, just as they would to 
other states’ courts); see also Sheppard v. Sheppard, 655 P.2d 895, 902 (Idaho 
1982); Jim v. CIT Fin. Servs. Corp., 527 P.2d 1222, 1228 (N.M. Ct. App. 1974). 
 16. The Minnesota Court of Appeals rejected such an approach, at least as an 
interpretation of the federal Constitution’s Full Faith and Credit clause.  See 
Desjarlait v. Desjarlait, 379 N.W.2d 139, 144 (Minn. Ct. App. 1985). 
 17. Oklahoma accorded full faith and credit through legislative authorization 
and judicial rule.  See OKLA. STAT. tit. 12, § 728 (2000); OKLA DIST. CT. R. 30(b);  see 
also Dennis W. Arrow, Oklahoma’s Tribal Courts: A Prologue, the First Fifteen Years of the 
Modern Era, and a Glimpse at the Road Ahead, 19 OKLA. CITY U. L. REV. 5, 63-70 
(1994) (describing the process through which Oklahoma’s tribal recognition rule 
developed); Shelly Grunsted, Full Faith and Credit: Are Oklahoma’s Tribal Courts 
Finally Getting the Respect They Deserve?, 36 TULSA L.J. 381 (2000) (addressing the 
effect the Full Faith and Credit clause has on Indian Nations). 
 18. For example, Michigan extends full faith and credit only to those tribal 
courts that offer reciprocity to judgments from Michigan courts.  MICH. CT. R. 
2.615. 
 19. See, e.g., John v. Baker, 982 P.2d 738, 763 (Alaska 1999) (holding that 
Alaska courts should, as a general rule, “respect tribal court decisions under the 
comity doctrine”). 
5
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spectrum: actual full faith and credit, purported full faith and 
credit, and comity.  Each of these positions is somewhat respectful 
toward tribal courts because in most run-of-the-mill cases, tribal 
court judgments will be recognized and enforced. However, one 
other approach is worth mentioning.  The South Dakota statute on 
recognition of tribal court judgments creates a presumption against 
recognition20 and requires a party seeking recognition of a tribal 
judgment to prove numerous facts related to the validity of the 
tribal judgment by clear and convincing evidence.21  If these facts are 
proven, then a state court judge may recognize the tribal judgment, 
but even so, only in a narrow range of circumstances.22  To be sure, 
South Dakota occupies a lonely and extreme point at the end of 
the spectrum.  The majority of states have adopted the notion of 
full faith and credit for tribal court rulings or a very respectful 
expression of comity.  Many states, however, have not yet addressed 
the question.  Because Minnesota and Arizona have recently 
adopted rules for the recognition of tribal court judgments and 
orders, they may be guides for other states. 
A. The Minnesota Rule 
After nearly a decade of discussion by several tribal and state 
court judges as well as other interested individuals and 
organizations, the Minnesota Supreme Court, in an order dated 
December 11, 2003, adopted a rule for the recognition of tribal 
court orders and judgments.23  The rule is primarily hortatory in 
nature24 and is agnostic as to whether to respect tribal court 
judgments.  As such, it is a disappointment to many of its original 
proponents.25  The Minnesota Rule requires recognition of tribal 
court orders and judgments only where already mandated by state 
 
 20. S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 1-1-25 (Michie 2003); see also Red Fox v. Hettich, 
494 N.W.2d 638, 647 (S.D. 1993) (holding that tribal member did not satisfy 
burden of proof necessary to show that tribal court had jurisdiction so that its 
judgment should be recognized under principle of comity). 
 21. S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 1-1-25(1)(a)-(e) (emphasis added). 
 22. Id. § 1-1-25(2)(a)-(d). 
 23. MINN. R. GEN. PRACT. 10 (effective Jan. 1, 2004). 
 24. MINNESOTA SUPREME COURT ADVISORY COMMITTEE ON GENERAL RULES OF 
PRACTICE, FINAL REPORT at 4 (2002). 
 25. Interview with Hon. Andrew M. Small, Associate Judge, Prairie Island 
Mdewakanton Dakota & Lower Sioux Communities, Bloomington, Minnesota 
(June 3, 2004) (on file with author). 
6
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or federal statute.26  Where not mandated by statute, the rule 
merely provides a list of discretionary factors for a court to consider 
in determining whether to recognize and enforce a tribal court 
order or judgment.27  The rule requires no hearing and establishes 
no presumption for or against recognition.28  It addresses two 
general areas: recognition where mandated by other law (Rule 
10.01) and discretionary recognition (Rule 10.02).  A critical 
description follows. 
1. Recognition Where Mandated by State or Federal Statute 
The Minnesota Rule provides at the outset that the orders, 
judgments, and other judicial acts of tribal courts29 shall be 
recognized and enforced where mandated by state or federal 
statute.30  Currently, only three31 federal and four Minnesota 
 
 26. MINN. R. GEN. PRACT. 10.01(a). 
 27. Id. 10.02(a). 
 28. Id. 
 29. The Minnesota Rule includes the tribal courts of “any federally 
recognized Indian tribe.”  Id. 10.01(a).  Some states limit recognition to the courts 
of tribes within the state.  See, e.g., N.Y. INDIAN LAW § 52 (McKinney 2003) 
(providing since 1909 that decisions of the peacemaker courts of the Seneca 
Nation are enforceable in state court); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 1E-1(a) (2003) (stating 
“[t]he courts of this State shall give full faith and credit to a judgment, decree, or 
order signed by a judicial officer of the Eastern Band of Cherokee Indians and 
filed in the Cherokee Tribal Court to the same extent as is given a judgment, 
decree, or order of another state . . . provided that the judgments, decrees, and 
orders of the courts of this State are given full faith and credit by the Tribal Court 
of the Eastern Band of Cherokee Indians”); N.D. CENT. CODE § 27-01-09 (1991) 
(stating “[t]he district courts shall recognize and cause to be enforced any 
judgment, decree, or order of the tribal court of the Three Affiliated Tribes of the 
Fort Berthold Reservation in any case” and subjecting the recognition to certain 
requirements, including “[reciprocity] involving the dissolution of marriage, the 
distribution of property upon divorce, child custody, adoption, an adult abuse 
protection order, or an adjudication of the delinquency, dependency, or neglect 
of Indian children if the tribal court had jurisdiction over the subject matter of the 
judgment, decree, or order”); WYO. STAT. ANN. § 5-1-111 (Michie 2002) (granting 
full faith and credit to the judicial records, orders and judgments of the courts of 
the Eastern Shoshone and Northern Arapaho Tribes of the Wind River 
Reservation, unless one of enumerated requirements is not met). 
 30. MINN. R. GEN. PRACT. 10.01(a). 
 31. The Parental Kidnapping Prevention Act is arguably a fourth federal 
statute that creates such a mandate, but it is omitted in the Advisory Committee’s 
comments to the Minnesota Rule.  See Parental Kidnapping Prevention Act, 28 
U.S.C. § 1738A (2000) (requiring states to enforce custody and visitation 
determinations of other states).  Although the definition of “State” provided in the 
statute does not specifically include tribes, some courts have held that it requires 
full faith and credit for tribal court orders.  Leeds, supra note 8, at 333 (examining 
7
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statutes address the recognition of tribal court orders and 
judgments.  The federal statutes consist of the Violence Against 
Women Act (“VAWA”),32 the Indian Child Welfare Act (“ICWA”),33 
and the Full Faith and Credit for Child Support Orders Act.34  The 
Minnesota statutes consist of the Uniform Child Custody 
Jurisdiction and Enforcement Act,35 the Uniform Interstate Family 
Support Act,36 the Minnesota Indian Family Preservation Act,37 and 
the Uniform Foreign Country Money-Judgments Recognition Act.38  
Given that these federal and state statutes already mandate the 
recognition of tribal court orders, this portion of the new 
Minnesota Rule adds little to the law and simply insures that the 
rule is read in a manner consistent with existing law. 
 
“political and legal relationships between tribal courts and their state and federal 
counterparts”). 
 32. Violence Against Women Act, 18 U.S.C. § 2265(a)-(b) (2000) (providing 
that a protection order issued by a tribal court “shall be accorded full faith and 
credit” by state courts, “and enforced as if it were the order of the enforcing State,” 
provided the tribal court had personal and subject matter jurisdiction, and the 
person against whom the order is sought was given “reasonable notice and 
opportunity to be heard”).  The statute does not require prior registration for the 
order to be enforced.  Id. § 2265(d)(2). 
 33. Indian Child Welfare Act, 25 U.S.C. § 1911(d) (2000) (requiring states to 
give “full faith and credit to the public acts, records, and judicial proceedings of 
any Indian tribe applicable to Indian child custody proceedings”). 
 34. Full Faith and Credit for Child Support Orders Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1738B 
(a), (b) (2000) (including “Indian country” in the definition of “State” and 
providing that states “shall enforce according to its terms a child support order 
made . . . by a court of another state” as long as the issuing court had personal and 
subject matter jurisdiction, and the contestants had reasonable notice and 
opportunity to be heard). 
 35. Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction and Enforcement Act, MINN. STAT. § 
518D.104 (2002) (requiring state to treat a tribe “as if it were a state of the United 
States” and to recognize and enforce child custody determinations made by 
tribes). 
 36. Uniform Interstate Family Support Act, MINN. STAT. § 518C.101(s)(1) 
(2002) (including “Indian tribe” in the definition of “State”). 
 37. Minnesota Indian Family Preservation Act, MINN. STAT. § 260.771, subd. 4 
(2002) (providing that orders of a tribal court concerning placement of children 
“shall have the same force and effect as orders of a court of this state”). 
 38. Uniform Foreign Country Money-Judgments Recognition Act, MINN. 
STAT. § 548.35, subd. 3 (2002) (providing that a foreign money judgment is 
“enforceable in the same manner as the judgment of another state which is 
entitled to full faith and credit” unless the judgment is not conclusive because of a 
list of comity-type factors).  While this statute does not expressly mention tribes, 
the Advisory Committee comment states that “[t]ribal court money judgments fall 
within the literal scope of this statute and the statutory procedures therefore may 
guide Minnesota courts considering money judgments.”  MINN. R. GEN. PRACT. 10 
advisory comm. cmt. 
8
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Rule 10.01 next purports to establish procedures for the 
enforcement of tribal court orders and judgments where required 
by federal or state statute.39  Given the procedural ambiguity in 
some of the statutes mandating enforcement and recognition, such 
guidance would be helpful, particularly in light of the problems 
that frequently arise when recognition is federally mandated.40  
However, Rule 10.01 does not live up to its billing.  Rule 10.01 
states that “[w]here an applicable state or federal statute establishes 
a procedure for enforcement of any tribal court order or judgment, 
that procedure must be followed.”41 
Unfortunately, only two of the state and two of the federal 
statutes contemplated in the Advisory Committee comment to the 
Minnesota Rule provide detailed procedures.  Minnesota’s 
Uniform Interstate Family Support Act provides instructions as to 
which court order should be controlling in the event that two or 
more separate courts have entered orders regarding the same child 
and obligor,42 and even provides some procedures for the 
enforcement of tribal support orders.43  Minnesota’s Uniform 
Foreign Country Money-Judgments Recognition Act specifically 
discusses the grounds for non-recognition of foreign judgments.44  
The federal Full Faith and Credit for Child Support Orders Act 
provides that a child support order issued by a court of another 
state (which includes tribes) shall be enforced if the other court 
had both personal and subject matter jurisdiction and provided 
 
 39. MINN. R. GEN. PRACT. 10.01(b). 
 40. See generally Leeds, supra note 8, at 349 (noting a high instance of non-
recognition, “often in direct violation of state policy or federal law”).  See also, e.g., 
PROCEDURES & FORMS COMM., PROCEDURES FOR REGISTRATION OF FOREIGN DOMESTIC 
ABUSE ORDERS (2004) (on file with author) (stating that although VAWA mandates 
full faith and credit, “in practical application, there are varying protocols 
throughout the United States on how this law is enforced”); Letter from Heidi A. 
Drobnick, Executive Director, Indian Child Welfare Law Center, to Frederick 
Grittner, Clerk, Minnesota Appellate Courts (Oct. 14, 2002) (Supreme Court 
Administrative Files CD-ROM, Disk 3 and 4, General Rules of Practice, No. CX-89-
1863, 02-08-28 Order Tribal Ct 10-29-02 Hearing & Responses, current through 
January 1, 2004) [hereinafter CD-ROM] (on file with author) (noting that lack of 
a procedural rule is a recurring problem in the enforcement of tribal court orders 
involving Indian children and teenagers, and providing five examples recently 
encountered by her agency in which non-recognition of tribal court orders placed 
Indian children and teenagers in dangerous situations). 
 41. MINN. R. GEN. PRACT. 10.01(b)(1). 
 42. Uniform Interstate Family Support Act, MINN. STAT. § 518C.207 (2002). 
 43. Id. §§ 518C.508, 518C.601-04. 
 44. Uniform Foreign Country Money-Judgments Recognition Act, MINN. 
STAT. § 548.35, subd. 4 (2002). 
9
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reasonable notice and opportunity to be heard to contestants.45  
VAWA arguably goes the furthest of the federal statutes in 
providing a procedure for the recognition of tribal court orders.  
Under VAWA, a tribal order shall be “enforced as if it were the 
order of the enforcing State or tribe”46 if the tribal court had 
personal and subject matter jurisdiction and provided reasonable 
notice and opportunity to be heard to the person against whom the 
order is sought.47  VAWA does not require registration or filing of 
the order in the enforcing jurisdiction prior to enforcement.  Nor 
does it require that the party against whom the order was issued be 
provided notice that the protection order has been registered or 
filed in the enforcing jurisdiction.48 
The other state and federal statutes, even though their 
wording is mandatory and unqualified, nevertheless provide little 
guidance as to procedures for the recognition and enforcement of 
tribal court orders and judgments.49  The ICWA, for example, 
mandates that states grant full faith and credit to Indian child 
custody proceedings in tribal courts.50  Though such clear and 
unqualified language ought to cause the routine enforcement of 
tribal court orders regarding Indian children, the result has been 
more complicated.  More than a quarter century after ICWA was 
enacted, tribal court orders regarding Indian children are not 
always enforced.51 
After mandating that specific procedures for enforcement 
established by state or federal statute must be followed, Rule 10.01 
provides more detailed guidelines only for VAWA.52  VAWA already 
contains fairly detailed guidelines.53  The lack of guidance in at 
least some of the other statutes has demonstrably been a barrier to 
the recognition and enforcement of tribal court orders and 
judgments.54  The Minnesota Tribal Court/State Court Forum 
 
 45. Full Faith and Credit for Child Support Orders Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1738B(c) 
(2000). 
 46. Violence Against Women Act, 18 U.S.C. § 2265(a) (2000). 
 47. Id. § 2265(b). 
 48. Id. § 2265(d). 
 49. See, e.g., Indian Child Welfare Act, 25 U.S.C. § 1911(d) (2000). 
 50. Id. 
 51. See sources cited supra note 40 (discussing problems with the enforcement 
of tribal court orders regarding Indian children). 
 52. MINN. R. GEN. PRACT. 10.01(b)(2). 
 53. See sources cited supra notes 46-48 and accompanying text (discussing the 
VAWA). 
 54. See sources cited supra notes 49-51 and accompanying text. 
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(“Minnesota Forum”) specifically requested the insertion of 
additional language in Rule 10.01 regarding procedures for the 
enforcement of tribal court orders and judgments under the Full 
Faith and Credit for Child Support Orders Act, the Indian Child 
Welfare Act, the Uniform Interstate Family Support Act, and the 
Minnesota Indian Family Preservation Act.55  Yet language that 
might provide such guidance was not included.  As a result, Rule 
10.01, which had the potential to make a useful contribution in 
clarifying these procedures for recognition of tribal court orders 
and judgments already mandated by statute, actually accomplished 
little in this regard and provides little specific guidance.  While the 
procedures for VAWA are helpful, similar guidance would have 
been useful in insuring recognition of the orders contemplated in 
these other important statutes. 
Thus, Rule 10.01, which addresses statutes mandating 
recognition, can be considered, at best, a modest first step.  The 
provisions related to VAWA may serve as a useful model for future 
additions to the rule to address these other important statutes.56 
2. Recognition Discretionary Where Not Mandated by Statute 
Rule 10.02 addresses recognition of tribal court orders and 
judgments where recognition is not mandated by statute.  Given 
the absence of statutory direction, numerous approaches were 
available to the Minnesota Supreme Court.  Of the numerous state 
courts that have already addressed the issue, most have taken an 
approach that would provide actual full faith and credit, purported 
full faith and credit, or comity.57  Each of these approaches is 
respectful of tribal court judgments.  The original proponents of 
such a Minnesota rule advocated a model that took shape in several 
other states: a rebuttable presumption in favor of recognition and a 
list of factors to aid courts in determining whether the presumption 
had been rebutted.58  Such an approach has been widely adopted59 
 
 55. Letter from Minnesota Tribal Court/State Court Forum to Frederick 
Grittner, Clerk, Minnesota Appellate Courts (Nov. 3, 2003) (CD-ROM, supra note 
40). 
 56. The Advisory Committee’s comments on the rule provide additional 
sound guidance. 
 57. See sources cited supra note 2.  South Dakota is a notable exception. 
 58. This was the approach suggested by the Minnesota Tribal Court/State 
Court Forum.  Petition for Adoption of a Rule of Procedure for the Recognition of Tribal 
Court Orders and Judgments, Minnesota Supreme Court, No. CX-89-1863, at A-1 
(filed Apr. 11, 2002) (CD-ROM, supra note 40) (petitioning the Minnesota 
11
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because it demonstrates respect for tribal courts while preserving 
state court discretion to insure justice is done. 
In Rule 10.02, the Minnesota Supreme Court took a different 
approach that can best be characterized as agnostic.  It provides no 
presumption one way or the other with regard to the recognition 
and enforcement of tribal court orders and judgments not 
mandated by state or federal statute, stating simply that 
“enforcement of a tribal court order or judgment is discretionary 
with the court” and providing a list of factors that the court may 
consider in the exercise of their discretion.60  The factors include: 
(1) whether the party against whom the order or 
judgment will be used has been given notice and an 
opportunity to be heard or, in the case of matters 
properly considered ex parte, whether the respondent will 
be given notice and an opportunity to be heard within a 
reasonable time; 
(2) whether the order or judgment appears valid on its 
 
Supreme Court for a rule stating that tribal court orders and judgments are 
“presumed valid and enforceable and shall be given full faith and credit by the 
courts of the State of Minnesota” unless the objecting party can demonstrate lack 
of personal or subject matter jurisdiction; fraud, duress, or coercion; lack of fair 
notice or fair hearing; or, in some cases, a non-final order). [hereinafter Minnesota 
Petition].  While the Petition used the words “full faith and credit,” its approach 
more nearly resembled comity.  Full faith and credit is a non-discretionary 
doctrine most often utilized on a state-to-state basis, whereas comity is a 
discretionary doctrine which allows a court to consider various factors in 
determining whether to recognize the judgment or order of a foreign court.  See, 
e.g., MINN. R. GEN. PRACT. 10 advisory comm. cmt. 
 59. See, e.g., WIS. STAT. § 806.245 (2003) (proclaiming full faith and credit for 
tribal courts, but setting forth a list of requirements that look more like comity); 
WYO. STAT. ANN. § 5-1-111 (Michie 2002) (granting full faith and credit to the 
judicial records, orders, and judgments of the courts of the Eastern Shoshone and 
Northern Arapaho Tribes of the Wind River Reservation, unless one of 
enumerated requirements is not met); 17B ARIZ. REV. STAT. TRIBAL CT. CIV. J. R. 1-7 
(establishing full faith and credit for tribal courts unless an objection is filed); 
MICH. CT. R. 2.615 (judgments and orders of tribal courts granting reciprocity to 
Michigan courts presumed valid and given full faith and credit unless objecting 
party proves one of enumerated factors); OKLA. STAT. tit. 12, § 728 (2003); OKLA. 
DIST. CT. R. 30(b); WA. SUPER. CT. CIV. C.R. 82.5(c) (full faith and credit to tribal 
court orders, judgments, and decrees as long as there is reciprocity, due process, 
and jurisdiction); Wilson v. Marchington, 127 F.3d 805, 810 (9th Cir. 1997) 
(concluding that “as a general principle, federal courts should recognize and 
enforce tribal judgments”); John v. Baker, 982 P.2d 738, 763 (Alaska 1999) 
(holding that Alaska courts should, as a general rule, “respect tribal court 
decisions under the comity doctrine”); Wippert v. Blackfeet Tribe, 859 P.2d 420 
(Mont. 1993) (upholding comity for tribal court judgments). 
 60. MINN. R. GEN. PRACT. 10.02(a). 
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face and, if possible to determine, whether it remains in 
effect; 
(3) whether the tribal court possessed subject-matter 
jurisdiction and jurisdiction over the person of the parties; 
(4) whether the issuing tribal court was a court of record; 
(5) whether the order or judgment was obtained by fraud, 
duress, or coercion; 
(6) whether the order or judgment was obtained through 
a process that afforded fair notice, the right to appear and 
compel attendance of witnesses, and a fair hearing before 
an independent magistrate; 
(7) whether the order or judgment contravenes the public 
policy of this state; 
(8) whether the order or judgment is final under the laws 
and procedures of the rendering court, unless the order is 
a non-criminal order for the protection or apprehension 
of an adult, juvenile or child, or another type of 
temporary, emergency order; 
(9) whether the tribal court reciprocally provides for 
recognition and implementation of orders, judgments 
and decrees of the courts of this state; and 
(10) any other factors the court deems appropriate in the 
interests of justice.61 
While several of the factors listed in Rule 10.02 mirror the 
factors considered under traditional principles of comity,62 both 
 
 61. Id. 
 62. Hilton v. Guyot, 159 U.S. 113, 158 (1895) (setting forth the following 
considerations for comity: 
opportunity for a full and fair trial . . . before a court of competent 
jurisdiction, conducting the trial upon regular proceedings, after due 
citation or voluntary appearance of the defendant, and under a system of 
jurisprudence likely to secure an impartial administration of justice . . . 
[with] nothing to show either prejudice in the court, or in the system of 
laws under which it was sitting, or fraud in procuring the judgment, or 
any other special reason why the comity of this nation should not allow it 
full effect); 
see also RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW § 482 (1987) (stating 
(1) A court in the United States may not recognize a judgment of the 
court of a foreign state if: 
  (a) the judgment was rendered under a judicial system that does not 
provide impartial tribunals or procedures compatible with due process of 
law; or 
  (b) the court that rendered the judgment did not have jurisdiction 
over the defendant in accordance with the law of the rendering state[.] 
13
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factor 9 (reciprocity)63 and factor 10 (any other factor deemed 
appropriate) introduce considerations that lie outside traditional 
comity analysis.  By recognizing discretion to consider any other 
“appropriate factor,” factor 10 potentially broadens the scope of 
the inquiry tremendously and opens a proceeding to many issues 
not heretofore thought to be relevant by other courts. 
The rule also lacks any requirement for a hearing.64 The 
Advisory Committee’s reasoning that “[i]n some instances, a 
hearing would serve no useful purpose or would be unnecessary”65 
is undoubtedly correct, particularly when recognition is strongly 
indicated.  However, a hearing would be a useful procedural 
safeguard and an appropriate sign of respect if a decision not to 
recognize a tribal court judgment or order is imminent.  The 
cumulative effect of the agnostic approach and the broad list of 
factors, concluding with the apparently open-ended grant of 
discretion in factor 10, is an extremely wide grant of discretion to 
state trial courts that gives comparatively little guidance on how 
that discretion should be exercised. 
While some judges who are knowledgeable about Indian tribal 
courts will appreciate that discretion, others may be uncomfortable 
with the lack of guidance given by the Minnesota Rule.  These 
features, along with the lack of a hearing requirement, present a 
risk that errors will occur.  Because of this rule, some valid tribal 
judgments may not be enforced.  Non-enforcement will constitute 
justice denied for some unlucky litigant. 
 
(2) A court in the United States need not recognize a judgment of the 
court of a foreign state if: 
  (a) the court that rendered the judgment did not have jurisdiction of 
the subject matter of the action; 
  (b) the defendant did not receive notice of the proceedings in 
sufficient time to enable him to defend; 
  (c) the judgment was obtained by fraud; 
  (d) the cause of action on which the judgment was based, or the 
judgment itself, is repugnant to the public policy of the United States or 
of the State where recognition is sought; 
  (e) the judgment conflicts with another final judgment that is 
entitled to recognition; or 
  (f) the proceeding in the foreign court was contrary to an agreement 
between the parties to submit the controversy on which the judgment is 
based to another forum.). 
 63. See, e.g., Wilson v. Marchington, 127 F.3d 805, 811-12 (9th Cir. 1997) 
(suggesting that the question of a reciprocity requirement is better left to the 
executive and legislative branches). 
 64. MINN. R. GEN. PRACT. 10.02(b). 
 65. Id. 10 advisory comm. cmt. 
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While errors can occur under any rule, one approach is to 
draft a rule to insure that the risk of error is properly allocated.  In 
light of the broad discretion in the rule and the lack of a hearing, it 
may be difficult for a losing party to create a record that 
demonstrates error.  Indeed, this rule seems uniquely designed to 
make errors that demonstrate disrespect for tribal courts 
unreviewable. 
Given the risk of widespread ignorance about tribal courts, 
one can make a strong argument that respect for tribal courts 
justifies at least a modest presumption in favor of the regularity and 
validity of tribal court proceedings.  In light of the fact that federal 
notions of due process have been imposed on tribal courts in much 
the same way as they have been imposed on state courts, a 
presumption that tribal court judgments are valid is sound; in 
practice, tribal courts function much like state courts.66 
In sum, the Minnesota Rule’s provisions related to federal or 
state statutory mandates are of limited assistance.  In circumstances 
in which recognition is discretionary, Minnesota Rule provides 
broad discretion and little guidance.  Naturally, judges who possess 
awareness and familiarity with tribal courts are likely to view 
judgments from tribal courts more favorably than judges who lack 
that knowledge.  The rule may well lead to arbitrariness in the 
enforcement of tribal judgments, and such arbitrariness will be 
difficult to review.  The lack of firm guidance in the Minnesota 
Rule may thus produce arbitrary outcomes and a lack of uniformity 
in the recognition of tribal court rulings in Minnesota courts. 
B. The Arizona Rules 
The Arizona Rules67 took effect December 1, 2000; three years 
prior to the promulgation of the Minnesota Rule.  Like the 
Minnesota Rule, the Arizona Rules were nearly a decade in 
development.  
Unlike the Minnesota Rule, which is divided into two basic 
 
 66. The Fourteenth Amendment and the great “Incorporation Controversy” 
ultimately was resolved by several Supreme Court decisions imposing uniform 
standards of various kinds of due process and procedure on state courts.  The 
Indian Civil Rights Act constituted Congress’s effort to impose the same kinds of 
due process on tribal courts.  For more on this, see Kevin K. Washburn, Tribal 
Courts and Federal Sentencing, 36 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 403 (2004).  The article discusses that 
tribal courts have clearly been required to provide many fundamental procedural 
rights for a longer time than state courts. 
 67. 17B ARIZ. REV. STAT. TRIBAL CT. CIV. J. R. 1-7. 
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sections (Rule 10.01: mandated recognition; and Rule 10.02: 
discretionary recognition), the Arizona Rules consist of seven 
different provisions, cast as Rules 1 through 7, that set forth 
considerably more detail than the Minnesota Rule.  The following 
discussion will describe the Arizona Rules and highlight some of 
the key differences between the Arizona and Minnesota rules. 
1. Presumption of Recognition of Tribal Judgments 
The heart of the Arizona approach is Rule 5.  It sets forth the 
standard for the recognition of tribal court orders and judgments 
in the Arizona courts.68  Rule 5 provides that tribal judgments “shall 
be recognized and enforced by the courts of this state to the same 
extent and shall have the same effect as any judgment, order, or 
decree of a court of this state.”69  Unless a timely objection is filed, 
the presumption of validity results in the recognition and 
enforcement of the tribal court judgment.70 
In the event a timely objection is filed, Rule 5 sets forth two 
mandatory71 and four discretionary considerations to guide courts.72  
The considerations are set forth as follows, with comparable 
Minnesota Rule provisions footnoted:73 
Mandatory Considerations Following Objection.  A tribal 
judgment shall not be recognized and enforced if the 
objecting party demonstrates to the court at least one of 
the following: 
 1.  The tribal court did not have personal or subject 
matter jurisdiction.74 
 2.  The defendant was not afforded due process.75 
Discretionary Considerations Following Objection.  The 
superior court may, in its discretion, recognize and 
enforce or decline to recognize and enforce a tribal 
judgment on equitable grounds, including: 
 1.  The tribal judgment was obtained by extrinsic 
 
 68. Id. 5. 
 69. Id. 5(a). 
 70. Id. 5(a), (b). 
 71. Id. 5(c). 
 72. Id. 5(d). 
 73. See MINN. R. GEN. PRACT. 10.02(a); see also supra notes 61-62 and 
accompanying text (laying out the Minnesota Rule). 
 74. Cf. 10.02(a) (Factor 3).  
 75. Cf. id. (Factor 6). 
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fraud.76 
 2.  The tribal judgment conflicts with another final 
judgment that is entitled to recognition.77 
 3.  The tribal judgment is inconsistent with the parties’ 
 contractual choice of forum.78 
 4.  Recognition of the tribal judgment or the cause of 
action upon which it is based is against fundamental 
public policy79 of the United States or the State of 
Arizona.80 
Both the Minnesota Rule and the Arizona Rules contain 
provisions to ensure that a defendant was afforded due process and 
that a tribal court had personal and subject matter jurisdiction 
before its judgments will be enforced.  Of the four discretionary 
considerations in the Arizona Rules, two are comparable to 
provisions found in the Minnesota Rule.  The Minnesota Rule, 
however, contains an additional five considerations, including 
whether the tribal court is a “court of record,” whether the tribal 
court has reciprocal rules for the recognition of state court 
judgments, and an extremely broad general provision.81 
The inspiration for the Arizona Rules is obvious; it tracks 
closely, in fact, nearly word-for-word, with the federal common law 
rule regarding the recognition of tribal court judgments.82  In 
contrast, the Minnesota Rule departs substantially from this widely 
used approach and charts a new course. 
2. Setting a Respectful Tone 
Despite certain similarities between the two rules, the Arizona 
Rules are decidedly more respectful toward tribal courts in other 
 
 76. Cf. id. (Factor 5). 
 77. No comparable provision exists in the Minnesota Rule, although the issue 
could be addressed in Minnesota’s catchall Factor 10.  See id. (Factor 10). 
 78. No comparable provision exists in the Minnesota Rule, although the issue 
could be addressed in Minnesota’s catchall Factor 10.  See id. (Factor 10). 
 79. Cf. id. (Factor 7).  
 80. 17B ARIZ. REV. STAT. TRIBAL CT. CIV. J. R. 5(c), (d). 
 81. See supra notes 60-61 and accompanying text (discussing the Minnesota 
Rule). 
 82. See supra note 62 and accompanying text (describing the Hilton and 
Restatement approaches to the recognition of foreign judgments); see also Wilson 
v. Marchington, 127 F.3d 805, 810 (9th Cir. 1997) (setting forth a standard for the 
recognition and enforcement of tribal judgments in federal courts upon which the 
Arizona Rules are based almost word-for-word). 
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ways as well.  The Arizona Rules offer two clarifications that are 
lacking in the Minnesota Rule.  For example, Arizona’s Rule 1 
specifies that “[d]eterminations regarding recognition and 
enforcement of a tribal judgment pursuant to these rules shall have 
no effect upon the independent authority of that tribal 
judgment.”83  It also notes that “[n]othing in these rules shall be 
deemed or construed to expand or limit the jurisdiction either of 
the State of Arizona or any Indian tribe.”84 
While these provisions are not strictly necessary, they serve two 
important functions.  First, by defining the limits of the rules, these 
statements may be useful to judges and individuals who have little 
or no experience in the area of Indian law or limited 
understanding of the place of Indian tribal courts within the 
American system.  Second, in elucidating the Arizona Supreme 
Court’s own understanding as to the authority of tribal courts, the 
statements set a tone of respect for the courts of the “Third 
Sovereign.”85  Inclusion of these statements in the very first rule 
provision sets a respectful tone for the rest of the provisions.  The 
absence of similar statements in the Minnesota Rule produces a 
different tone. 
Just as Rule 1 starts out the Arizona recognition rules with a 
respectful approach toward tribal courts, the concluding rule 
provision implements respect in a practical manner.  Rule 7,86 
which is unlike any provision to be found in the Minnesota Rule, 
provides that when issues arise as to the validity of a tribal court 
judgment, the district court “shall . . . attempt to resolve any issues 
raised . . . by contacting the tribal court judge who issued the 
judgment.”87  In other words, the Arizona Rules actually encourage 
inter-sovereign judicial cooperation.88  While such a provision could 
potentially cause friction when state court judges question the 
judgments of the tribal court judges, it seems more likely to 
produce improved communication, understanding, and 
cooperation between state and tribal courts.  The Minnesota Rule 
 
 83. 17B ARIZ. REV. STAT. TRIBAL CT. CIV. J. R. 1. 
 84. Id. 
 85. O’Connor, supra note 1, at 1. 
 86. 17B ARIZ. REV. STAT. TRIBAL CT. CIV. J. R. 7. 
 87. Id. 
 88. While communication may not be advisable or even appropriate in all 
cases, this rule constitutes recognition that many of the disputes in which such 
issues will arise are local in nature and informal communication between judges 
may be a good practical solution. 
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would undoubtedly be improved if it promoted such respect and 
cooperation. 
3. Detailed Filing Procedures 
In many ways, the Arizona Rules are also more helpful to 
litigants and judges than the Minnesota Rule. 89  While Rule 2 is not 
substantively different from provisions in the Minnesota Rule,90 
Rule 3 sets forth relatively detailed procedures for the recognition 
and enforcement of tribal court orders and judgments.91  Rule 3 
states that a “copy of any tribal judgment may be filed in the office 
of the clerk of the superior court in any county of this state.”92  It 
further provides instructions to the enforcing party on how to file 
the tribal judgment, how to serve the responding party with notice 
of the filing, and how to file proof of service.93 
Arizona Rule 4 continues in this helpful vein by explaining the 
procedures for objections.94  Under Rule 4, “[a]ny objection to the 
 
 89. Rule 1 contains a provision similar to that of the Minnesota Rule 
regarding recognition of tribal court orders and judgments where mandated by 
state or federal statute.  See supra note 30 and accompanying text (discussing the 
similar Minnesota Rule provision).  The Arizona Rules explicitly provide that 
“[t]hese rules do not apply to tribal judgments for which federal law requires that 
states grant full faith and credit recognition or for which state law mandates 
different treatment.”  17B ARIZ. REV. STAT. TRIBAL CT. CIV. J. R. 1.  In addressing 
VAWA, the Minnesota Rule is somewhat more helpful than the Arizona Rules.  
Moreover, the Advisory Committee comment in the Minnesota Rule notes the 
relevant state and federal statutes.  MINN. R. GEN. PRACT 10 advisory comm. cmt.. 
 90. 17B ARIZ. REV. STAT. TRIBAL CT. CIV. J. R. 2.  Rule 2 sets forth definitions 
for the terms “tribal court” and “tribal judgment.”  While the definitions are a bit 
more specific than anything found in the Minnesota Rule, they are essentially 
parallel to provisions of the Minnesota Rule.  For instance, the Arizona Rules 
definition of “tribal court,” while going into more detail, essentially includes the 
courts of any federally recognized Indian tribe.  Id.  The Minnesota Rule also 
contains the phrase “any federally recognized Indian tribe,” but it is not noted as 
being a definition, and is only emphasized in the Advisory Committee comment.  
MINN. R. GEN. PRACT. 10.01.  The Arizona Rules define “tribal judgment” as “any 
final written judgment, decree or order of a tribal court duly authenticated in 
accordance with the laws and procedures of the tribe or tribal court.”  17B ARIZ. 
REV. STAT. TRIBAL CT. CIV. J. R. 2.  The Minnesota Rule appears to contemplate a 
similar definition, yet it is obscured by being included as one of the factors courts 
may consider in determining whether to recognize a tribal court order or 
judgment.  MINN. R. GEN. PRACT. 10.02(a)(8) (stating “whether the order or 
judgment is final under the laws and procedures of the rendering court . . . .”). 
 91. 17B ARIZ. REV. STAT. TRIBAL CT. CIV. J. R. 3. 
 92. Id. 3(a). 
 93. Id. 3(b). 
 94. Id. 5; see also supra notes 68-80 and accompanying text (discussing the 
recognition of tribal judgments according to Rule 5). 
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enforcement of a tribal judgment shall be filed within twenty (20) 
days of service or of receipt of the notice . . . or within twenty-five 
(25) days of the date of mailing, whichever last occurs.”95  The rule 
further indicates that “[i]f an objection is filed within this time 
period, the superior court may, in its discretion, set a time period 
for replies and/or set the matter for hearing.”96  Like the 
Minnesota Rule,97 the Arizona Rules leave the decision of whether 
to hold a hearing to the discretion of the court.98  If no objections 
are timely filed, a tribal judgment is enforceable under the Arizona 
Rules.99  In short, while the Minnesota Rule purports to set forth 
procedures, the Arizona Rules actually create procedures.  While 
the Minnesota Rule provides procedures in the context of VAWA, it 
provides none for other circumstances.100 
One final procedural difference is worth noting.  Under 
Arizona Rule 6, an Arizona court “shall stay enforcement of the 
tribal judgment until the appeal is concluded, the time for appeal 
expires, or the stay of execution expires or is vacated.”101  This 
provision applies to circumstances in which an appeal of the tribal 
court judgment is pending or may be filed, or a stay of execution 
has been ordered by the tribal court.102  Although the Minnesota 
Rule raises the issue of finality as one of the factors that may be 
considered by the state court,103 it provides no guidance as to how 
to proceed in circumstances in which the order is not final.  
Nevertheless, the order ought to be enforced if and when it 
becomes final.  While a state court in Minnesota may have 
discretion to stay enforcement in appropriate circumstances,104 the 
Minnesota provision has the effect of making finality a substantive 
and dispositive factor rather than a procedural hurdle.  
 
 95. 17B ARIZ. REV. STAT. TRIBAL CT. CIV. J. R. 4. 
 96. Id. 
 97. MINN. R. GEN. PRACT. 10.02(b); see also supra notes 64-65 and 
accompanying text (discussing the Minnesota Rule provision making a hearing 
optional). 
 98. 17B ARIZ. REV. STAT. TRIBAL CT. CIV. J. R. 4. 
 99. Id. 5. 
 100. MINN. R. GEN. PRACT. 10.01(b)(2).  To be fair, the Arizona Rules eschew 
any claim to applicability if a federal or state mandate is involved, so parties are 
without guidance if the mandate statute fails to provide clear direction. See 17B 
ARIZ. REV. STAT. TRIBAL CT. CIV. J. R. 1. 
 101. 17B ARIZ. REV. STAT. TRIBAL CT. CIV. J. R. 6. 
 102. Id. 
 103. MINN. R. GEN. PRACT.  10.02(a)(8). 
 104. Id. 10.02. 
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Accordingly, a Minnesota court judge may simply refuse to 
recognize the tribal court order or judgment in such 
circumstances. 
In summary, the Arizona Rules are not only more respectful to 
tribal courts, they are more detailed and, as a result, more helpful 
to both litigants and judges.  Part III of this article will describe and 
compare the rulemaking processes in Arizona and Minnesota, in 
the hopes of drawing some conclusions about the very different 
results.105 
III. THE RULEMAKING PROCESS 
During the latter half of the twentieth century, tribal courts 
began to flourish.  In cases such as Williams v. Lee,106 National Farmers 
Union Insurance Co. v. Crow Tribe,107 and Iowa Mutual Insurance Co. v. 
LaPlante,108 the U.S. Supreme Court repeatedly affirmed the 
legitimacy of tribal courts.  And Congress, for its part, has not only 
required state courts to grant full faith and credit to certain kinds 
of tribal court judgments,109 it has supported tribal courts with 
federal appropriations.110 
As federal support for tribal courts has increased, tribal courts 
have developed, in the words of Justice O’Connor, by “leaps and 
bounds.”111  Increased reservation commerce and populations have 
 
105.    See infra Part III. 
 106. 358 U.S. 217, 223 (1959). 
 107. 471 U.S. 845, 856-57 (1985). 
 108. 480 U.S. 9, 14-15 (1987). 
 109. See supra notes 31-34 and accompanying text. 
 110. The U.S. Commission on Civil Rights urged Congress to increase the 
funding of tribal courts in amounts equal to the funding provided to state courts.  
See U.S. COMMISSION ON CIVIL RIGHTS: THE INDIAN CIVIL RIGHTS ACT 72-73 (1991).  
While this has never been achieved, Congress responded more modestly in 1993 
by enacting the Indian Tribal Justice Act.  Pub. L. No. 103-176, § 2, 107 Stat. 2004 
(1993) (codified at 25 U.S.C. § 3601) (indicating that “tribal justice systems are an 
essential part of tribal governments and serve as important forums for ensuring 
public health and safety and the political integrity of tribal governments”).  In that 
legislation, Congress also established an Office of Tribal Justice Support within the 
Bureau of Indian Affairs and authorized annual appropriations up to $50 million 
for assistance to tribal courts.  See Pub. L. No. 103-176, 107 Stat. 2004 (codified at 
25 U.S.C. §§ 3611-14, 3621(b)).  Seven years later, in 2000, Congress enacted the 
Indian Tribal Justice Technical and Legal Assistance Act of 2000.  Pub. L. No. 106-
559, 114 Stat. 2778 (codified at 25 U.S.C. § 3651) (finding that “tribal justice 
systems are an essential part of tribal governments and serve as important forums 
for ensuring the health and safety and the political integrity of tribal 
governments”). 
 111. O’Connor, supra note 1, at 1. 
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increased the number of civil disputes heard in tribal courts.112  
And increased mobility on and off the reservation has created a 
need for cross-border enforcement of judgments.113 
Recognizing the increasing number of issues related to tribal 
courts, the Conference of Chief Justices of State Supreme Courts 
began to look into the problems between state and tribal courts in 
the late 1980s.114  Research by the National Center for State Courts 
revealed that “jurisdictional disputes had arisen most frequently in 
the areas of the Indian Child Welfare Act, domestic relations 
(family law), contract law as well as taxation, hunting and fishing, 
and certain other areas.”115  To develop approaches to address 
these issues, the Conference of Chief Justices selected Arizona, 
Oklahoma, and Washington as pilot states to develop “model 
approaches to consensus building” and report on them.116 
A. The Arizona Process 
Toward this end, the Arizona Court Forum was created in 
1989,117 and held its first meeting in early 1990.118  The Arizona 
Court Forum was originally composed of four state court leaders, 
three tribal court officials, and a forum consultant.119  The Arizona 
Court Forum held four meetings in 1990, all of which were open to 
the public.120  During that year, it also prepared a report on its 
efforts, to be presented to the Conference of Chief Justices.121 
Because the original forum’s purpose was to identify issues, 
develop potential problem-solving approaches, and ultimately 
report their findings and recommendations to the Conference of 
 
 112. Minnesota Petition, supra note 58, at 7.  
 113. Id. 
 114. ARIZONA COURT FORUM, STATE AND TRIBAL COURT INTERACTION: BUILDING 
COOPERATION: AN ARIZONA PERSPECTIVE 4 (1991), available at http://supreme. 
state.az.us/stfcf/handouts/StateTribal%20Court%20Interaction.pdf (last visited 
Nov. 12, 2004) [hereinafter BUILDING COOPERATION]. 
 115. Id. 
 116. Id. at 5. 
 117. Arizona Court Forum Chairman Michael C. Nelson’s Petition for Adoption of 
Rules of Procedure for Recognition of Tribal Court Judgments, In re: Rules of Procedure 
for the Recognition of Tribal Court Judgments, available at 
http://supreme.state.az.us/ 
stfcf/handouts/Recognition%20of%20Judgements%20Petition.pdf (last visited 
Nov. 12, 2004) [hereinafter Arizona Petition]. 
 118. BUILDING COOPERATION, supra note 114, at 34. 
 119. Id. 
 120. Id.  
 121. Arizona Petition, supra note 117. 
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Chief Justices, its initial scope was quite broad.122  The issue of 
recognition of tribal court judgments was only one of many issues 
that the Arizona Court Forum addressed in its early years.123  In 
fact, the idea of a supreme court rule on recognition of tribal court 
judgments was not yet on the horizon when the Arizona Court 
Forum submitted its first report to the Conference of Chief Justices 
in 1991.124  Instead, early suggestions for approaches to the 
recognition issue included intergovernmental agreements, 
legislative action, and even establishing recommended procedural 
guidelines for the tribal courts in order to ensure that their 
judgments would be enforced in state court.125  While the idea of 
intergovernmental agreements remained a popular topic for 
discussion in other areas, it appears to have been discounted early 
on as an approach to the area of recognition of judgments simply 
because of the sheer number of agreements that would be 
required.126  The idea of legislative action, while eventually 
discarded, remained viable for several years.127  The Arizona Court 
Forum’s report even contained a model Uniform Enforcement of 
State and Tribal Court Judgments Act.128 
Although the Arizona Court Forum later rejected some of its 
initial ideas, other priorities remained.  For example, educating 
tribal and state court judges about the various jurisdictional issues 
was an early and lasting priority.  Increasing the interaction 
between tribal and state court judges, making tribal ordinances and 
court decisions more readily available, and ensuring that tribes had 
access to Arizona law and various other resources were other key 
priorities for the Arizona Court Forum.129 
One characteristic of the Arizona Court Forum that should be 
noted was its openness to public comment.  Since its earliest 
meetings, the forum was open to the public.130  Beginning with the 
 
 122. See, e.g., BUILDING COOPERATION, supra note 114, at 34. 
 123. Id. 
 124. See id. at 13-33. 
 125. Id. at 34 (emphasis added).  The last idea doesn’t appear to have been 
discussed after the first meeting. 
 126. See Arizona State, Tribal & Federal Court Forum, Minutes from Meeting 
(Oct. 20, 1990), available at http://supreme.state.az.us/stfcf (last visited Nov. 12, 
2004). 
 127. See Arizona Petition, supra note 117 (stating that in 1995, an expanded and 
newly organized forum decided not to pursue legislation). 
 128. BUILDING COOPERATION, supra note 114, app. E. 
 129. Id. app. A; see also id. at 34. 
 130. See id. app. A. While the presence of “guests” was not noted at the first 
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second meeting, public comments were sought at the end of each 
meeting.131  Written comments by the public were also sought as the 
Arizona Court Forum’s report neared completion.132  Despite so 
much opportunity for public comment and the concomitant ease 
with which controversy could arise, it appears that the Arizona 
Court Forum received only one written comment (whose author 
also enclosed a disputed parking ticket).133  Furthermore, there 
appears to have been only two instances of mild discord at forum 
meetings.  In one of these instances, a tribal court “guest” is 
described as having taken “strong exception” to a discussion 
regarding the “sophistication of the Navajo tribal courts.”134  In the 
other instance, a law student “commented [that] there had been 
some concern expressed by Salt River tribal council members who 
were not asked to participate or provide input into Arizona Court 
Forum procedure,” whereupon no less than three Arizona Court 
Forum members attempted to allay these concerns.135  Thus, 
despite ample opportunity for public comment and the possibility 
of resulting controversy, the Arizona Court Forum’s early meetings 
seem to have passed uneventfully. 
At a national conference sponsored by the Conference of 
Chief Justices held in Seattle, Washington, from June 30 to July 1, 
1991, Arizona, Oklahoma, and Washington presented their 
reports.136  Arizona’s report, entitled Building Cooperation, set forth 
the Arizona Court Forum’s recommendations and rationale for 
action in the areas of education, jurisdiction, intergovernmental 
agreements, state legislation, and federal legislation.137  The 
appendices to the report provided minutes of the forum’s 
meetings, profiles of Arizona tribes, sample intergovernmental 
agreements, a list of Arizona cases involving jurisdiction which were 
decided by the U.S. Supreme Court, the model Uniform 
 
Forum meeting, it was not unusual for up to 15 “guests” to be present at later 
meetings, although most of those named appear to be members of the legal 
community.  Id. 
 131. Id. 
 132. Id. at 34 (establishing a period for comment regarding the report). 
 133. Id. app. F. 
 134. Id. at 34. 
 135. Id. (establishing a period for comment regarding the report). 
 136. See, e.g., Tribal Court Clearinghouse, Building on Common Ground: A 
National Agenda to Reduce Jurisdictional Disputes Between Tribal, State, and Federal 
Courts, available at http://www.tribal-institute.org/articles/common.htm (last 
visited Nov. 12, 2004). 
 137. BUILDING COOPERATION, supra note 114, at 9-33. 
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Enforcement of State and Tribal Court Judgments Act, and a lone 
public comment.138 Among the more specific recommendations in 
the report was establishment of an Indian Law section of the 
Arizona State Bar.139  In fact, the Indian Law section held its 
organizational meeting on November 8, 1990, even before the 
recommendation was presented in Seattle.140 
In response to one of the report’s recommendations, the 
Arizona legislature passed a groundbreaking statute in 1992 that 
made tribal court involuntary commitment orders recognizable 
and enforceable in state courts.141  In 1994, the Arizona Supreme 
Court adopted rules for the recognition of tribal court involuntary 
commitment orders.142  Thus, the Arizona Court Forum began 
seeing the results of its efforts almost immediately. 
Another general recommendation of the Arizona Court 
Forum was the establishment of an ongoing colloquium of state, 
federal, and tribal officials.143  As the forum continued with its work, 
a permanent forum was established by Administrative Order of the 
Arizona Supreme Court in 1994.144  Chief judges of the Ninth 
Circuit and the District Court of Arizona appointed judges to serve 
on the new forum.145  The new forum was expanded to include 
federal members, and was renamed the State, Tribal & Federal 
Court Forum (“Arizona Forum”).146  In its new incarnation, the 
Arizona Forum consisted of four federal members, six state 
members, at least seven tribal members, one state bar member, and 
two public members.147  The state, tribal, and public members serve 
for two-year terms.148 
The next landmark event in the Arizona Rules process was the 
Ninth Circuit’s decision in Wilson v. Marchington149 in September of 
 
 138. Id. apps. A-F. 
 139. Id. at 17. 
 140. Id. 
 141. ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 12-136 (1992). 
 142. 17B ARIZ. REV. STAT. TRIBAL CT. INVOL. COMMITMENT ORDERS R. 1-6. 
 143. Arizona State, Tribal & Federal Court Forum Website, at 
http://supreme.state. az.us/stfcf (last visited Nov. 12, 2004). 
 144. Arizona Supreme Court Admin. Order, In re: Appointment of Members to 
State, Tribal, and Federal Court Forum (No. 2001-70), available at  
http://supreme. state.az.us/orders/admorder/orders01/2001-70.pdf (last visited 
Nov. 12, 2004). 
 145. Id. 
 146. Id. 
 147. Id. 
 148. Id. 
 149. 127 F.3d 805 (9th Cir. 1997). 
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1997.  This case set forth a common law standard for the 
recognition and enforcement of tribal court judgments by the 
federal courts.150  The Arizona Forum discussed the case during its 
June 1998 meeting and adopted a draft of proposed rules for the 
recognition of tribal court judgments that echoed the Marchington 
standard.151  The proposed rules adopted Marchington’s 
presumption in favor of recognition.152  While Marchington was a 
federal case, the forum noted that it “provides an indication of the 
current common law which is useful to frame rules that implement 
current Arizona common law.”153  Despite the fact that the Arizona 
Forum agreed that the proposed rules, when redrafted, would serve 
as the basis for the petition to the Supreme Court, no members of 
the public made any comments when given the opportunity.154 
By the Arizona Forum’s next meeting, in December of 1998, 
the Arizona Rules petition had been filed with the Supreme Court.  
At this meeting, the forum discussed procedures for the 
enforcement of tribal domestic violence orders, noting that they 
were not covered by the rule.155  In January of 1999, the Arizona 
Supreme Court sought public comment on the Arizona Rules 
petition.156  Following the comment period, the Arizona Forum 
authorized its chairperson to file a reply to the comments.157  The 
 
 150. Id. at 810. 
 151. Arizona State, Tribal & Federal Court Forum, Minutes from Meeting  
(June 9, 1998), available at http://supreme.state.az.us/stfcf/98%20thru%2099/98-
06-09%20 minutes.pdf (last visited Nov. 12, 2004).  It should be noted that the 
Arizona Forum also discussed other issues during its meetings.  Id.  This article, 
however, focuses only on those issues which relate to the recognition of tribal 
court judgments. 
 152. Id. 
 153. Id. 
 154. Id.  The Arizona Rules were not nearly as controversial as the Minnesota 
Rule.  The only real opposition was the Civil Practice Committee of the State Bar 
Association, which was concerned that the effect of the rule went beyond current 
law.  County Attorneys were also somewhat concerned until the proposed rule was 
amended to clarify that it only applied to civil cases.  Other than that, the Arizona 
Rules were simply not an area of concern.  Telephone Interview with David 
Withey, Chief Counsel, Administrative Office of Arizona Courts (Jul. 14, 2004). 
 155. Arizona State, Tribal & Federal Court Forum, Minutes from Meeting  
(Dec. 4, 1998), available at http://supreme.state.az.us/stfcf/98%20thru%2099/99-
08-04%20 minutes.pdf (last visited Nov. 12, 2004).  The non-recognition of tribal 
judgments doesn’t appear to have been as much of a problem in Arizona.  
Telephone Interview with David Withey, supra note 154. 
 156. Arizona State, Tribal & Federal Court Forum, Minutes from Meeting 
(Dec. 4, 1998), available at http://supreme.state.az.us/stfcf/98%20thru%2099/99-
08-04%20 minutes.pdf (last visited Nov. 12, 2004). 
 157. Arizona State, Tribal & Federal Court Forum, Minutes from Meeting  
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forum agreed to clarify that the rule applies to civil judgments only, 
and agreed to a few other minor amendments.158  No additional 
changes were suggested.159 
At the Arizona Forum’s meeting on October 26, 1999, it was 
reported that the Arizona Supreme Court would circulate the 
petition to twenty-two practitioners and academics to comment on 
the need for the rules and the court’s authority to adopt them.160  
David Withey, the Chief Counsel for the Arizona Supreme Court 
Administrative Office of the Courts, and an active participant in the 
Arizona Forum since its inception, would also submit a comment.161  
The forum discussed practical aspects of enforcing tribal court 
judgments.162  Members noted the availability of state court forms 
on the Arizona Supreme Court’s website, as well as the availability 
of WordPerfect versions of these forms suitable for tribal 
modification.163  An invitation to tribal courts to make their own 
forms available on the website was also extended.164  Again, despite 
opportunity for public comment, apparently no comments were 
offered.165 
The petition was scheduled to be considered at the Arizona 
Supreme Court’s Rules Agenda meeting in January of 2000.166  
However, the court postponed its consideration of the petition 
until its next Rules Agenda meeting due to lack of response of 
academics and experts from whom the Court had requested to 
submit comments.167  In the meantime, the Arizona Forum 
discussed possible education efforts and the logistics of making 
tribal codes and regulations available in some sort of centralized 
 
(Aug. 4, 1999), available at http://supreme.state.az.us/stfcf (last visited Nov. 12, 
2004). 
 158. Id. 
 159. Id. 
 160. Arizona State, Tribal & Federal Court Forum, Minutes from Meeting  
(Oct. 26, 1999), available at http://supreme.state.az.us/stfcf/00%20thru%2004/ 
2000-02-25%20minutes.pdf (last visited Nov. 12, 2004). 
 161. Id. 
 162. Id. 
 163. Id. 
 164. Id. 
 165. Id. 
 166. Id. 
 167. Arizona State, Tribal & Federal Court Forum, Minutes from Meeting  
(Feb. 25, 2000), available at http://supreme.state.az.us/stfcf/00%20thru%2004/ 
2000-02-25%20minutes.pdf (last visited Nov. 12, 2004).  Apparently, no one, 
including tribes, was very interested in the proposed rule.  Telephone Interview 
with David Withey, supra note 154. 
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location.168  It also heard reports from experts regarding the 
enforcement of tribal judgments where mandated by federal 
statute.169  While the recognition and enforcement of child support 
orders was identified as not being a problem, the recognition and 
enforcement of VAWA orders was identified as a significant 
problem, despite the federal mandate.170  Possible remedies 
identified were intergovernmental agreements and the 
standardization of forms and protocols.171 
Finally, at the Arizona Supreme Court’s May 2000 Rules 
Agenda meeting, the Arizona Forum’s petition was approved with 
some modifications.172  More than a decade in the making, the 
Arizona Rules became effective on December 1, 2000.173  The rules 
tracked the Marchington standard for the recognition and 
enforcement of tribal judgments closely, beginning with a 
presumption of enforcement, and listing limited circumstances 
under which enforcement may not occur.174  They also set forth 
careful procedures for the enforcement and recognition of tribal 
court judgments.175 
 
 168. Id. 
 169. Id. 
 170. Id. 
 171. Id. 
 172. Id. 
 173. Arizona State, Tribal & Federal Court Forum, Minutes from Meeting (Jan. 
19, 2001), available at http://supreme.state.az.us/stfcf/00%20thru%2004/2001-
01-19%20 minutes.pdf (last visited Nov. 12, 2004).  Indeed, the only significant 
area of concern for the Arizona Supreme Court appears to have been whether the 
rule was a reflection of current law, or whether it took a step beyond current law.  
Telephone Interview with David Withey, supra note 154. 
 174. See supra Part II.B (discussing the Arizona Rules, as well as the Marchington 
standard). 
 175. Id.  It seems that the Arizona Rules translated immediately into action.  At 
the Arizona Forum’s meeting on January 19, 2001, David Withey reported that he 
had already provided forms to state court clerks to use in processing tribal court 
cases under the rule.  Arizona State Tribal & Federal Court Forum, Minutes from 
Meeting (Jan. 19, 2001), available at http://supreme.state.az.us/stfcf (last visited 
Nov. 12, 2004). The clerks had decided that a statutory filing fee would apply.  Id. 
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B. The Minnesota Process176 
While the process for proposing the Minnesota Rule was 
modeled in some ways on the Arizona approach,177 the process 
unfolded somewhat differently.178 
1. Formation of a Working Group and Development of a Rule 
It was not until the summer of 1996 that informal meetings 
began.179  Thereafter, a group of tribal judges and lawyers 
approached Justice Sandra Gardebring of the Minnesota Supreme 
Court about the possibility of establishing a committee to work on 
the issues.180  Justice Gardebring assisted in recruiting state court 
judges from the various districts.181  The first meeting of the Tribal 
Court/State Court Forum (“Minnesota Forum”) took place on July 
18, 1997, at the Prairie Island Mdewakanton Dakota Community 
Tribal Court.182  Unfortunately, Justice Gardebring departed the 
Supreme Court in 1998, and the work of the forum was temporarily 
suspended.183 
The Minnesota Forum resumed in May of 1999,184 but the loss 
 
 176. The Honorable Andrew M. Small kindly provided the authors with copies 
of many of the files he accumulated during the rulemaking process.  The rule 
petition and many of the comments to the rule have been compiled on a CD-ROM 
and are on file at the Minnesota State Law Library in the Minnesota Judicial 
Center.  CD-ROM, supra note 40.  The Honorable Robert H. Schumacher and 
Michael Johnson of the State Court Administration and General Rules Advisory 
Committee also provided very helpful background information on the Minnesota 
Rule. 
 177. Interview with Hon. Andrew M. Small, supra note 25; Interview with Hon. 
Robert H. Schumacher, Judge, Minnesota Court of Appeals & Chair, Minnesota 
Tribal Court/State Court Forum, in St. Paul, Minnesota (June 29, 2004). 
 178. While the Minnesota Forum began its work in the early 1990s, members 
of the Minnesota legal community were not interested in working on the issue of 
the recognition and enforcement of tribal court judgments.  Interview with Hon. 
Andrew M. Small, supra note 177. 
 179. Minnesota Petition, supra note 58. 
 180. Interview with Hon. Robert H. Schumacher, supra note 177. 
 181. Id.  When asked about the qualifications of the state court judges who 
were asked to serve on the Minnesota Forum, Judge Schumacher stated that he 
himself had no experience with the issue of tribal court recognition prior to 
serving as Chair of the Minnesota Forum.  However, he had long been interested 
in Indian Law, and in fact started a legal advice clinic for the Indian community in 
Minneapolis’s Upper Midwest American Indian Center in the early 1970s. 
 182. Minnesota Petition, supra note 58, at 2. 
 183. State Court Committee on Tribal Court/State Court Forum, Minutes 
from Meeting  (May 6, 1999) (on file with author). 
 184. Id. 
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of Justice Gardebring’s leadership had a distinct impact.  Members 
of the Minnesota Supreme Court decided that a rule regarding the 
recognition of tribal court judgments should be pursued through 
the legislature instead.185  The supreme court also sought to 
separate the Minnesota Forum into a tribal court committee and a 
state court committee that would meet jointly only periodically.186 
Although it was technically split into two separate committees, 
the Minnesota Forum continued to meet jointly.187  The forum 
identified several priorities: educating the public about tribal 
courts, ensuring the quality of tribal court judges and procedures, 
and pursuing “full faith and credit.”188  Though developing a rule 
for the recognition and enforcement of tribal court judgments was 
a high priority,189 the process gathered momentum slowly until 
2001.  Between May and September of that year, the tribal councils 
of many of the Minnesota tribes passed resolutions in support of 
the state enforcement of tribal court orders.190 
In February of 2002, a Mille Lacs Tribal Court judge refused to 
recognize a Minnesota state court judgment on the ground that the 
Minnesota state courts do not grant reciprocity to Mille Lacs Tribal 
Court orders and judgments.191  This decision, like the Wilson v. 
 
 185. Id.  Justice Stringer presented this approach to the Minnesota Forum.  Id. 
 186. Id. 
 187. Id.; see also Interview with Hon. Robert H. Schumacher, supra note 177.  It 
also continues to meet jointly.  Id. 
   188.    Interview with Hon. Robert H. Schumacher, supra note 177.  
 189. Id.  
 190. See, e.g., Bois Forte Reservation Tribal Council Resolution No. 142-2001 
(May 10, 2001); Leech Lake Band of Ojibwe Resolution No. 01-130 (June 27, 
2001); Upper Sioux Community Board of Trustees Resolution No. 33-2001 (Aug. 
17, 2001); White Earth Tribal Council Resolution No. 001-01-023 (Aug. 20, 2001); 
Mille Lacs Band of Ojibwe Indians Resolution No. 09-04-116-01 (Sept. 25, 2001); 
see also RED WING REPUBLICAN EAGLE, More Harmony Sought Between Courts (Aug. 2, 
2002), available at http://www.republican-eagle.com/main.asp?Search=1&Article 
ID=14492&SectionID=40&SubSectionID=114&S=1 (last visited Nov. 12, 2004) 
(reporting that the Prairie Island Tribal Council “‘unequivocally’ supports the 
petition”).  The President of the Minnesota Chippewa Tribe (which includes six of 
the eleven Minnesota tribes) stated later that “there is support among all Tribal 
governments for the proposal.”  Petition for Adoption of a Rule of Procedure for the 
Recognition of Tribal Court Orders and Judgment: Hearing Before the Minnesota Supreme 
Court, No. CX-89-1863 (Minn. Oct. 29, 2002) (testimony of Chairman Norman 
Deschampe). 
 191. Household Fin. Serv. v. Weyaus, No. 01-CV-546, slip op. at 6 (Mille Lacs 
Band Ct. of Cent. Jurisdiction, Feb. 4, 2002) (explaining that in order for the 
tribal court to recognize a judgment from another jurisdiction, tribal ordinance 
requires courts of other jurisdictions to “have enacted a full faith and credit 
provision in their Constitution or Statutes or on a case-by-case basis . . . granted 
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Marchington decision in Arizona, served as a trigger that drew 
attention to the recognition issue. 
Barely two months later, on April 11, 2002, a delegation of 
tribal court and state court members of the Minnesota Forum met 
with Chief Justice Kathleen Blatz and Justice Edward Stringer of the 
Minnesota Supreme Court to present their Petition for Adoption of 
a Rule of Procedure for the Recognition of Tribal Court Orders.192  
The proposed rule established a presumption of validity and 
enforcement which could be overcome by a showing that: 
1) the tribal court lacked personal or subject matter 
jurisdiction; or 
2) the order or judgment was obtained by fraud, duress, 
or coercion; or 
3) the order or judgment was not obtained through a 
process that afforded fair notice and a fair hearing; or 
4) the order or judgment is not final under the laws and 
procedures of the rendering court, unless the order is a 
non-criminal order for the protection or apprehension of 
an adult, juvenile or child, or another type of temporary, 
emergency order.193 
The proposed rule also contained procedural requirements 
for the enforcement of money judgments and emergency orders, as 
well as a specification that the rule would apply neither to orders 
where enforcement is mandated by statute, nor to criminal orders 
of tribal courts.194 
Justices Blatz and Stringer referred the Petition to the 
Minnesota Supreme Court’s Advisory Committee on General Rules 
of Practice (“Advisory Committee”).  The Advisory Committee 
would review the rule and make further recommendations to the 
court.  At this point, opposition began to appear.  On May 22, 2002, 
the Advisory Committee held a public hearing on the proposed 
rule.  Several individuals complained that they learned of this 
hearing only by publication the day before the hearing and, as a 
result, were unable to attend the meeting.  One of these 
individuals, a Minnesota Court of Appeals judge, expressed his 
 
full faith and credit to judicial determinations” of the Mille Lacs tribal court). 
 192. Letter from Lenor A. Scheffler, Partner, Best & Flanagan L.L.P., to Philip 
Frickey, Richard W. Jennings Professor of Law, University of California School of 
Law (May 1, 2002) (on file with author); see also Minnesota Petition, supra note 58. 
 193. Minnesota Petition, supra note 58, at A-1. 
 194. Id. at A-2, A-3. 
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opposition to the rule by letter, and particularly questioned the 
Minnesota Forum’s assertion that the proposed rule had 
unanimous support.195  Another of these individuals, William J. 
Lawrence of the Native American Press/Ojibwe News, also voiced 
opposition to the rule, complaining that some of the Minnesota 
Forum meetings were closed to the public and that he and other 
rule opponents had been prohibited from voicing their concerns at 
public forum meetings.196  While it is not clear how much effect 
these individuals had on the Advisory Committee’s ultimate views, 
the committee noted concerns about the allegations regarding the 
lack of opportunity for public comment.197 
Following the Advisory Committee hearing, several 
developments occurred.  Two significant changes were made to the 
rule.  First, a reciprocity element, requiring tribes to recognize state 
court orders before their orders would be recognized in state court, 
was added.198  Then, following a request from the Conference of 
Chief Judges, a due process reference was also added.199  While the 
notice and fair hearing elements of due process were part of the 
rule as originally proposed, this amendment broadened 
consideration of due process issues.  In addition, the Minnesota 
Forum responded in writing to some of the concerns raised by the 
Committee in its hearing on May 22, 2002,200 and filed an amended 
 
 195. Letter from Hon. R. A. Randall, Judge, Minnesota Court of Appeals to 
Hon. Robert Schumacher, Judge, Minnesota Court of Appeals (May 22, 2002).  
While it is true that the proposed rule may not have had the unanimous support of 
the citizens of the State of Minnesota, it did have the unanimous support of the 
Forum members, which was the assertion contained in the Petition.  Minnesota 
Petition, supra note 58, at 2. 
 196. Affidavit of William J. Lawrence, Publisher, NATIVE AMERICAN 
PRESS/OJIBWE NEWs (May 22, 2002) (CD-ROM, supra note 40).  While the 
Minnesota Forum meetings held on tribal land were closed to the public, those 
held on state land were open to the public.  Indeed, opponents of the proposal 
attended the meetings.  Interview with Hon. Robert H. Schumacher, supra note 
177. 
 197. Interview with Michael B. Johnson, Senior Legal Counsel, State Court 
Administration & Staff of Advisory Committee, in St. Paul, Minnesota (July 1, 
2004).  The Committee also considered some of the points made by the rule’s 
opponents.  Recommendations of Minnesota Supreme Court Advisory Committee on 
General Rules of Practice (Aug. 19, 2002) [hereinafter Advisory Comm. Report I]. 
 198. The reciprocity element was added on May 22, 2002.  Amended Petition for 
Adoption of a Rule of Procedure for the Recognition of Tribal Court Orders and Judgments 
(June 26, 2002) [hereinafter Amended Petition]. 
 199. The due process reference was added on June 26, 2002.  Amended Petition, 
supra note 198. 
 200. Letter from Hon. Andrew M. Small, Associate Justice, Prairie Island 
Mdewakanton Dakota & Lower Sioux Communities to Hon. Edward C. Stringer, 
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petition.201 
Meanwhile, several influential groups registered their 
opposition to the rule.  The first group to do so was the Minnesota 
Sheriff’s Association Board of Directors, which recommended 
rejection of the proposed rule and referral of the issue to the 
legislature.202  The second group to register its opposition was the 
Minnesota County Attorney’s Association, which complained that 
the rule was overbroad, that the issues should be addressed by the 
legislature instead, that the rule did not address immunity for state 
and local officials, and that it would result in great financial costs to 
the State and counties.203  The Minnesota State Bar Association 
Court Rules and Administration Committee also weighed in with a 
recommendation that the recognition of tribal court orders and 
judgments should be pursued by some means, but that the most 
appropriate action would be to integrate the terms of the proposed 
rule into existing rules and statutes.204 
On August 19, 2002, the Advisory Committee issued its 
report.205  The Committee described the proposed rule as 
mandating full faith and credit for tribal court judgments, with very 
limited exceptions.206  More specifically, the committee believed 
that the presumption of enforcement, combined with what it 
perceived as a narrow list of exceptions, made “aspects of comity 
either mandatory or, at least, presumptively mandatory, in contrast 
to the traditionally discretionary nature of comity.”207 
 
2. Public Comments on the Proposed Rule 
 
After receiving the Advisory Committee’s report, the 
Minnesota Supreme Court scheduled a hearing for October 29, 
2002.208  It requested written comments on or before October 15, 
 
Chair, General Rules of Practice Committee (July 5, 2002). 
 201. Amended Petition, supra note 198. 
 202. Letter from Larry Podany, Executive Director, Minnesota Sheriffs’ 
Association to Advisory Comm. (Aug. 5, 2002) (CD-ROM, supra note 40). 
 203. Letter from Doug Johnson et al., Minnesota County Attorneys Association 
to Hon. Edward C. Stringer, Chair, Advisory Comm. (Aug. 6, 2002). 
 204. Letter from Mark H. Gardner, Co-Chair, Minnesota State Bar Association 
Court Rules and Administration Comm. to Advisory Comm. (Aug. 14, 2002). 
 205. Advisory Comm. Report I, supra note 197. 
 206. Interview with Michael B. Johnson, supra note 197. 
 207. Advisory Comm. Report I, supra note 197, at 4. 
 208. Order for Hearing to Consider Petition for Adoption of a Rule of Procedure for the 
Recognition of Tribal Court Orders and Judgments, No. CX-89-1863 (Minn. Aug. 2002). 
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2002,209 and received numerous public comments.210  The 
comments fell generally into two groups: those in support and 
those opposed. 
a. Rule Supporters 
As might have been expected, many individuals and 
organizations from the Indian legal community supported the rule.  
Among those were the Minnesota American Indian Bar Association 
(“MAIBA”),211 the Indian Child Welfare Law Center,212 law 
professors from all four Minnesota law schools,213 and the Northern 
Plains Tribal Judicial Institute.214  Several of these groups 
emphasized the need for the rule.  The Indian Child Welfare Law 
Center, for example, described five recent cases in which children 
and teenagers faced potentially dangerous situations because of 
non-recognition of a tribal court order.215  MAIBA similarly noted 
that “state courts have not consistently or effectively enforced” 
tribal court orders, and asserted the need for some uniformity in 
this area, which the rule could provide.216  MAIBA also argued, as 
did the Northern Plains Tribal Judicial Institute, that parties should 
not be able to re-litigate issues that had already been decided in a 
lawful forum.217  The law professors pointed out that the scope of 
 
 209. Id. 
210. The Court received nearly 500 pages of material, which is available on 
CD-ROM at the Minnesota State Law Library in the Minnesota Judicial Center.  
The comments are a monument to participatory government.  Some comments 
were drafted by attorneys, others by laypeople.  The comments cover a wide range 
of perspectives and subjects, some seemingly tangential to the issue. 
211.     Letter from Eileen J. Strejc, President, Minnesota American Indian Bar 
Association, to Frederick Grittner, Clerk, Minnesota Appellate Courts (Oct. 14, 
2002) (CD-ROM, supra note 40). 
212.     Letter from Heidi A. Drobnick, Executive Director, Indian Child Welfare 
Center, to Fredrick Grittner, Clerk, Minnesota Appellate Courts (Oct. 14, 2002) 
(CD-ROM, supra note 40). 
213. Author Kevin Washburn submitted comments jointly with Professor Eric 
Janus (William Mitchell College of Law), Professor Mary Jo Brooks-Hunter 
(Hamline University School of Law) and Professor Scott Taylor (University of St. 
Thomas).  Written Statement by Law Professors Urging the Adoption of a Rule of 
Procedure for the Recognition of Tribal Court Orders and Judgments in State 
Courts (Oct. 15, 2002) (CD-ROM, supra note 40) [hereinafter Law Professor’s 
Statement]. 
214 Letter from B.J. Jones, Director, Northern Plains Tribal Judicial Institute, to 
Minnesota Supreme Court (filed Oct. 15, 2002) (CD-ROM, supra note 40). 
 215. Letter from Heidi A. Drobnick, supra note 212. 
 216. Letter from Eileen J. Strejc, supra note 211. 
 217. Id.; Letter from B.J. Jones, supra note 214. 
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such a rule was limited because of the limited nature of tribal 
jurisdiction, but that the need for the rule was great in the cases in 
which it would apply.218  They also provided background on the 
development of tribal courts.219 
Other organizations expressing support for the rule were the 
Minnesota Department of Human Services and Mid-Minnesota 
Legal Assistance.220  Both of these organizations, working directly 
with impoverished tribal members, could be expected to encounter 
issues surrounding the recognition of tribal court orders on a fairly 
regular basis.221  Mid-Minnesota Legal Assistance pointed out that 
the rule would improve efficiency and noted that tribal judges are 
well qualified.222 
In addition to tribal judges, two individuals from the judicial 
community who provided comments were Dennis J. Murphy, Chair 
of the Administration Committee of the Conference of Chief 
Judges, and Robert D. Walker, a trial court judge for the District 
Court of Martin County in Minnesota.223  Particularly strong 
support came from the Minnesota Supreme Court’s own 
Implementation Committee on Multicultural Diversity and Racial 
Fairness in the Courts.224  The Implementation Committee stated 
that the rule would help to combat “general ignorance in the legal 
community about issues of tribal court jurisdiction, sovereignty and 
 
 218. See Law Professor’s Statement, supra note 213, at 1. 
 219. Id. at 2-3. 
 220. Letter from Wayland Campbell, Director, Child Support Enforcement 
Division, Minnesota Department of Human Services, to Hon. Kathleen Blatz, 
Chief Justice, Minnesota Supreme Court (Oct. 15, 2002) (CD-ROM, supra note 
40); Letter from Jeremy Lane, Executive Director, Mid-Minnesota Legal 
Assistance, to Frederick Grittner, Clerk, Minnesota Appellate Courts (Oct. 26, 
2002) (CD-ROM, supra note 40). 
 221. Letter from Jeremy Lane, supra note 220. 
 222. Id. 
 223. Letter from Hon. Dennis J. Murphy, Chief Judge, Ninth Judicial District, 
District Court of Minnesota, to Frederick Grittner, Clerk, Minnesota Appellate 
Courts (Oct. 15, 2002) (expressing a desire to appear before the supreme court to 
support the conference of the Full Faith and Credit Proposal) (CD-ROM, supra 
note 40); Letter from Robert D. Walker, Judge, Fifth Judicial District, District 
Court of Minnesota, to Hon. Kathleen Blatz, Chief Justice, Minnesota Supreme 
Court (Nov. 4, 2002) (supplementing the oral presentation made at the Minnesota 
Supreme Court hearing in support of the Full Faith and Credit Proposal) (CD-
ROM, supra note 40). 
 224. Letter from Bridget Gernander, Project Specialist, Court Services Divison, 
State Court Administrators Office, Minnesota Supreme Court, to Frederick 
Grittner, Clerk, Minnesota Appellate Courts (Oct. 11, 2002) (CD-ROM, supra note 
40). 
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autonomy.”225  The committee asserted that the rule would help to 
educate the judiciary and the bar, would improve the relationship 
between state and tribal courts, and would make Native Americans 
safer overall, an important priority in light of the large Native 
American population in Minnesota.226 
Finally, Brian Melendez, a member of the Advisory Committee, 
which had advised against the rule, submitted a comment in 
support of the rule.227  In particular, he criticized the recurring 
argument by many rule opponents that the legislature is the proper 
forum for the recognition issue.228  If the legislature did not 
approve of the Minnesota Rule, he pointed out, it was free to 
legislate.229 
b. Rule Opponents 
Opposition to the rule created unlikely bedfellows.  Among 
the most vocal opponents were individual Native Americans who 
expressed the view that tribal courts were in some way 
incompetent.  For example, a member of the Lower Sioux 
community opposed the rule because she felt the tribal courts were 
plagued by “favoritism, nepotism, and inefficiency.”230 A self-
described documentary film producer raised similar concerns,231 as 
did Indian journalists with the Native American Press/Ojibwe News.232  
 
 225. Id. 
 226. Id. 
 227. Petition for Adoption of a Rule of Procedure for the Recognition of Tribal Court 
Orders and Judgment: Hearing Before the Minnesota Supreme Court, No. CX-89-1863 
(Minn. Oct. 29, 2002) (statement of Brian Melendez, Member of the Advisory 
Committee on the General Rules of Practice dated Oct. 15, 2002) (CD-ROM, supra 
note 40) [hereinafter Minnesota Petition Hearing]. 
 228. See id. 
 229. Id. 
 230. Id.  (affidavit of Maxine V. Eidsvig dated Oct. 15, 2002). 
 231. Letter from Sheldon Wolfchild, Producer and Spokeman for the “New 
Buffalo” Elders, to Frederick Grittner, Clerk, Minnesota Appellate Courts (Oct. 14, 
2002) (requesting time to speak at the hearing and that the Minnesota Supreme 
Court deny the Petition) (CD-ROM, supra note 40).  Sheldon Wolfchild is 
producer of a documentary “New Buffalo” that apparently dealt with enrollment 
issues of a small wealthy tribe, the Shakopee Mdewakanton Sioux Community.  See 
id. 
 232. Minnesota Petition Hearing, supra note 227 (statement of Clara NiiSka 
dated May 22, 2002 and supplemental oral testimony filed Nov. 6, 2002).  NiiSka’s 
comments apparently were based primarily on a personal experience with a Red 
Lake tribal court.  Id.  Ms. NiiSka’s publisher, William J. Lawrence, was also a vocal 
opponent of the rule.  Minnesota Petition Hearing, supra note 227 (statement of 
William J. Lawrence dated May 22, 2002). 
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Many of the comments reflected the feelings of individual Indian 
litigants who were disgruntled following previous tribal court 
proceedings. 
Aligned with these individual Indians were citizens groups that 
oppose tribal courts and other exercises of tribal sovereignty, such 
as Citizens for Lawful Government, a citizen’s group located near 
the White Earth Chippewa Reservation, and Proper Economic 
Resource Management (“PERM”), an organization that has 
supported unsuccessful federal litigation with the Mille Lacs Band 
of Ojibwe over reservation boundaries.233  PERM noted the lack of 
separation of powers in tribal governments.234  Opposition was 
registered as well by state and local government officials, such as 
Frank Corteau, a Mille Lacs County Commissioner, and Sondra 
Erickson, State Representative of Minnesota District 17A.235  
Representative Erickson cited a lack of information about tribal 
courts and questioned whether they are independent, whether they 
uphold civil rights, and the scope of tribal jurisdiction.236  Some of 
the mainstream organizations that had previously made their 
opposition to the rule known also filed comments.237 
 
 233. See Randy V. Thompson, Supreme Court Adopts PERM’s Argument on Tribal 
Court Judgements [sic], at http://www.perm.org/articles/a180.html (last visited 
Nov. 12, 2004). 
 234. Id. 
235.    CD-ROM, supra note 40.  
 236. Letter from Sondra Erickson, Minnesota State Representative District 
17A, Minnesota House of Representatives, to Hon. Kathleen Blatz, Chief Justice, 
Minnesota Supreme Court (Oct. 14, 2002) (CD-ROM, supra note 40). 
 237. The Minnesota State Bar Association Court Rules and Administration 
Committee reiterated its suggestion that the provisions of the rule be integrated 
into existing rules and statutes.  Letter from Mark Gardner, Co-Chair, Minnesota 
State Bar Association Court Rules and Administration Committee, to Minnesota 
Supreme Court (Oct. 14, 2002) (CD-ROM, supra note 40).  Minnesota State Bar 
Association Chairman John Duckstad, however, testified in favor of the rule.  
Minnesota Petition Hearing, supra note 227.  The Minnesota County Attorneys 
Association reiterated its concern about financial burdens to the state and 
counties, and again asserted that the rule was overbroad, and should be addressed 
through the legislative process.  Letter from John Kingrey, Executive Director, 
Minnesota County Attorneys Association, to Frederick Grittner, Clerk, Minnesota 
Appellate Courts (Oct. 15, 2002) (CD-ROM, supra note 40) (requesting to speak at 
the hearing against the proposal).  The Minnesota Sheriffs’ Association also 
repeated its position that the issue should be referred to the legislature.  Letter 
from Larry Podany, Executive Director, Minnesota Sheriffs’ Association, to 
Minnesota Supreme Court, Rules Advisory Committee (July 11, 2002) (CD-ROM, 
supra note 40). 
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3. The Hearing 
The Minnesota Supreme Court public hearing took place on 
October 29, 2002.  In addition to the written comments, the court 
considered the oral testimony of selected individuals.238  At the 
hearing, Chief Justice Blatz indicated that the court would accept 
additional written comments on the proposed rule.239  In the 
month of November, 2002, several individuals and organizations 
submitted further written materials.240  Rule supporters attempted 
to clarify some of the issues raised during the hearing.241   
Hennepin County Judge Robert A. Blaeser responded to 
several concerns regarding the rule.242  Judge Blaeser first noted 
that many of the opponents of the rule had personal issues with 
their tribal courts, but that the rule was set up with safeguards so 
that if their complaints were legitimate, litigants would be 
protected.243  He also responded to concerns about the over-
breadth of the rule by noting that tribal court jurisdiction is already 
 
 238. Those testifying were: Hon. Robert H. Schumacher, Minnesota Court of 
Appeals; Hon. Henry M. Buffalo, Jr., Tribal Court of the Shakopee Mdewakanton 
Sioux Community; Hon. Robert Blaeser, Fourth Judicial District; David Herr, 
Advisory Committee; Jon Duckstad, President of MSBA; Bill Lawrence, Native 
American Press/Ojibwe News; Randy V. Thompson, Nolan, MacGregor & 
Thompson; Laura Guthrie, Citizens for Lawful Government; Earl Mauss, Cass 
County Attorney; Kevin K. Washburn, University of Minnesota Law School; 
Sheldon Wolfchild, documentary producer; Jackie CrowShoe, Shakopee Child 
Welfare Officer; Clara NiiSka, Native American Press/Ojibwe News; Norman 
Deschampe, President of Minnesota Chippewa Tribe; and George Soule, Bowman 
and Brooke L.L.P.. Minnesota Petition Hearing, supra note 227.  Apparently not 
everyone who wanted to was able to testify because of time constraints.  Clara 
NiiSka, Minnesota Supreme Court Rejects Proposed ‘Full Faith and Credit’ Rule, NATIVE 
AMERICAN PRESS/OJIBWE NEWS (Mar. 7, 2003), available at http://www.press-
on.net/articles/3-7court_rejects_rule.html (last visited June 21, 2004) 
(subscription required to view article online). Minnesota State Bar Association 
Chairman John Duckstad, however, testified in favor of the rule.  Minnesota Petition 
Hearing, supra note 227. 
239. Minnesota Petition Hearing, supra note 227. 
240. Having learned that the Petition had not cited the new Arizona Rules, the 
author submitted additional materials, including a copy of the Arizona Rules, 
foreshadowing the subject of this article.  See Letter from Kevin K. Washburn, 
Associate Professor, University of Minnesota Law School, to Frederick Grittner, 
Clerk, Minnesota Appellate Courts (Nov. 1, 2002) (CD-ROM, supra note 40). 
241.    Minnesota Petition Hearing, supra note 227. 
242. Letter from Judge Robert A. Blaeser, Judge, Fourth Judicial District, to 
Frederick Grittner, Clerk, Minnesota Appellate Courts (Nov. 1, 2002) (CD-ROM, 
supra note 40). 
243. Id. 
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limited.244  Finally, he stated that the legislature is not the proper 
forum for this issue because the recognition of tribal court 
judgments occurs entirely within the judicial system, and the 
legislature is subject to political pressures that would interfere with 
the process of reasoned analysis.245   
Attorney Vanya Hogen of Faegre & Benson addressed several 
other concerns.246  In response to the idea that tribal courts are 
somehow incompetent, she noted that each of the tribal courts in 
Minnesota possesses “established rules of procedure, law-trained 
judges, and [renders] decisions that are available to the public.”247  
Hogen also urged the court to “recognize much of the opposition 
for what it is: allegations of disgruntled litigants and accusations by tribal 
political dissenters.”248   
Finally, the Minnesota Forum responded to several of the 
major issues.249  It noted that the proposed rule did not constitute 
substantive law, but simply recognized traditional principles of 
comity.250  The forum also listed the statutes, rules, and court 
decisions regarding the issue in the various states.251 
On March 5, 2003, the Supreme Court rejected the rule as 
proposed, and ordered the Advisory Committee “to consider rules 
to provide a general framework for the recognition and 
enforcement of tribal orders and judgments where there is an 
existing legislative basis for doing so.”252 An attorney, Randy V. 
Thompson, claimed credit for the proposed rule’s defeat on behalf 
of his clients, including Native American Press publisher William 




 246. Letter from Vanya Hogen, Attorney, Faegre & Benson L.L.P., to Frederick 
Grittner, Clerk, Minnesota  Appellate Courts (Nov. 4, 2002) (CD-ROM, supra note 
40). 
 247. Id. 
 248. Id. (emphasis in original). 
 249. Letter from Judge Henry M. Buffalo, Jr., Chair, Minnesota Tribal Court 
Association, and Judge Robert H. Schumaker, Chair, State Court Committee, 
Tribal Court/State Court Forum, to Frederick Grittner, Clerk, Minnesota 
Appellate Courts (Nov. 5, 2002) (CD-ROM, supra note 40). 
 250. Id. 
 251. Id. 
 252. Mark A.  Cohen, Enforcement Proposal for Tribal Courts Rejected, MINN. LAW., 
Mar. 10, 2003, at 1. 
 253. See, e.g., Thompson, supra note 233. 
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4. A New Rule 
In April, 2003, Judge Small reported to the Advisory 
Committee that in the month since the court’s order regarding the 
rule, the Minnesota Forum had received reports of problems 
regarding both VAWA and ICWA.254  Judge Small encouraged the 
Advisory Committee to reconsider the rule.255  On September 17, 
2003, the Advisory Committee issued its final report in which it 
included its recommended version of the rule.256  The new proposal 
was nearly identical to the Minnesota Rule as it would ultimately be 
approved by the Minnesota Supreme Court.257  In its report, the 
Advisory Committee admitted that its new proposed rule was 
largely hortatory in nature.258  Two days later, the Supreme Court 
solicited comments on the new proposed rule, to be filed no later 
than November 3, 2003.259  Responding to that invitation, the 
Minnesota Forum praised the Advisory Committee’s efforts, and 
suggested amendments to the new proposed rule.260  The most 
important of these suggestions was to include in Rule 10.01(b)(1) a 
direct reference to other state and federal statutes mandating 
recognition of tribal court orders and judgments.261 
On December 11, 2003, the Minnesota Supreme Court 
adopted a rule which is virtually identical to that proposed by the 




 254. Letter from Hon. Andrew M. Small, Judge, Lower Sioux Community in 
Minnesota Tribal Court Judgment, to Michael B. Johnson, Staff Attorney, Advisory 
Committee (Apr. 11, 2003). 
 255. Id. 
256. Recommendations of Minnesota Supreme Court Advisory Committee on 
General Rules of Practice (Sept. 17, 2003). 
257. Id. at 4-6. 
258. Id. at 4. 
259.   Order for Hearing to Consider Petition for Adoption of a Rule of Procedure for the 
Recognition of Tribal Court Orders and Judgments, No. CX-89-1863 (Minn. Aug. 2002). 
260. Letter from Hon. Andrew Small, Judge, Tribal Court/State Court Forum, 
to Frederick Grittner, Clerk, Minnesota Appellate Courts (Nov. 3, 2003) (CD-
ROM, supra note 40). 
261. Id. 
262. The supreme court did not adopt any of the suggestions made by the 
Minnesota Tribal Court/State Court Forum. 
263. See MINN. R. GEN. PRACT. 10. 
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IV. THE LEGACY OF PUBLIC LAW 280 
Given that Minnesota state and tribal judges began with a 
proposal similar to Arizona’s and used a similar process to evaluate 
the proposal, how did Arizona and Minnesota reach such different 
results?  The answer could be explained by various factors, such as 
the different level of leadership on the issue at the state level in the 
two states, the existence of strong federal judicial leadership in the 
Arizona process (which was absent in the Minnesota process), or 
even the different characteristics of tribal courts in the two states.  
While each of these factors will be discussed briefly, the best answer 
likely involves a 1953 statute called Public Law 280, and its 
enduring legacy in Minnesota. 
A. Public Law 280 
In 1953, Congress enacted a law that shifted certain broad-
ranging power over Indian reservations to certain states.264  
Commonly referred to as Public Law 280, this law gave states the 
power to exercise criminal jurisdiction265 and civil adjudicatory 
authority over Indian reservations.266 
Public Law 280 was an unprecedented extension of state power 
over Indians on Indian reservations and a reflection of the official 
federal Indian policy of the time, a period that has since become 
known as the “Termination Era.”267  The termination policy that 
Public Law 280 embodied reflected Congress’s long term design to 
terminate the special relationship that Indian tribes had with the 
United States, end tribal governance, and subject individual 
Indians, like other Americans, to the general laws of the states.268 
After the enactment of Public Law 280, the courts of the 
designated states possessed the power to exercise criminal 
jurisdiction on Indian reservations as well as “jurisdiction over civil 
causes of action between Indians or to which Indians are parties      
 
264. Act of Aug. 15, 1953, ch. 505, 67 Stat. 588-90 (codified in scattered 
sections of 18 and 28 U.S.C.). 
265. Id. § 2. 
266. Id. § 4. 
267. See generally CAROLE GOLDBERG, PLANTING TAIL FEATHERS: TRIBAL SURVIVAL 
AND PUBLIC LAW 280 (1997).  Professor Goldberg is the leading expert on Public 
Law 280; the book includes law review articles published over a span of twenty five 
years on the subject.  Id. 
268. See generally RENNARD STRICKLAND ET AL., COHEN’S HANDBOOK OF FEDERAL 
INDIAN LAW 152-53, 170-77 (1982). 
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. . . .”269 As a result, state courts were available to litigants even for 
disputes between Indians on a reservation. 
Public Law 280 did not apply to reservations in Arizona and 
several other states, but it did apply to most of the reservations in 
Minnesota. 270  The difference in the legal regime in Arizona and 
Minnesota accomplished by Public Law 280 is striking.  In Williams 
v. Lee,271 a case that arose in Arizona shortly after the enactment of 
Public Law 280, the Arizona courts served as the forum for a simple 
dispute over the sale of goods between a non-Indian seller and an 
Indian consumer arising on the Navajo Reservation in northern 
Arizona.272  In adjudicating the dispute, the Arizona Superior Court 
ruled for the plaintiff and the Arizona Supreme Court affirmed.273  
The Indian defendants then sought certiorari.274 
In a terse and sharply worded opinion, the U.S. Supreme 
Court reversed the Arizona Supreme Court.275  Noting the fact that 
the tribe has “greatly improved its legal system through increased 
expenditures and better-trained personnel,”276  the Court held that 
“to allow the exercise of state jurisdiction here would undermine 
the authority of the tribal courts over Reservation affairs and hence 
would infringe on the right of the Indians to govern themselves.”277 
Thus, in the absence of Public Law 280 authority or other 
authority conferred on states by Congress, the Supreme Court was 
fiercely protective of the authority of tribal courts.  In later cases, 
the Supreme Court continued to rebuff attempts by Arizona 
authorities to exercise state power on Indian reservations.278  In 
contrast to the independence of tribal courts and tribal 
governments in Arizona, Public Law 280 allowed broad intrusions 
of state power on Indian reservations in Minnesota and other 
states. 
Public Law 280 also insured that even in the absence of a tribal 
 
269. 28 U.S.C. § 1360(a) (2000). 
270. Id.  The states where it applied immediately were California, Minnesota 
(except the Red Lake Reservation), Nebraska, Oregon, and Wisconsin.  Id.  It was 
later extended to Alaska and other states.  Id. 
271.   358 U.S. 217 (1959). 
272. Id. 
273. Williams v. Lee, 319 P.2d 998 (1958). 
274. Williams, 358 U.S. at 218. 
275.    Id. 
276. Id. at 222. 
277. Id. at 223. 
278. See, e.g., McClanahan v. Ariz. State Tax Comm’n, 411 U.S. 164 (1973); 
Warren Trading Post v. Ariz. State Tax Comm’n, 380 U.S. 685 (1965). 
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court, there was a forum in state courts to resolve disputes between 
Indians on tribal lands.279  Given the existence of the state court 
forum for most of the reservations in Minnesota, tribal courts were 
not needed to resolve disputes; from a purely legal standpoint, they 
could be considered “optional.” 280  The history of tribal courts in 
Minnesota suggests that this may have been the view of tribal 
governments.  Most of the active tribal courts in Minnesota were 
not founded until after 1978.281 
In creating state judicial authority on Indian reservations, 
Public Law 280 not only effectively stunted the development of 
tribal judicial systems; it also had other side effects, including 
preventing an environment of respect for tribal courts from 
developing.  In Arizona, where state authorities repeatedly sought 
to exercise authority on Indian reservations, they were consistently 
rebuffed in a steady procession of U.S. Supreme Court cases that 
likely had the effect of embarrassing and, ultimately, educating 
Arizona officials.  The protectiveness of the Supreme Court and the 
lower federal courts created a respectful environment in which 
tribal courts could operate side-by-side with state courts. 
In contrast, in Minnesota, state courts have routinely been able 
to exercise substantial—and lawful—authority on Indian lands.282  
The pervasive influence and power of the state on Indian 
reservations has made the remaining power of Indian tribes 
comparatively less substantial and, to some people, less legitimate. 
It would be anathema to a Navajo to prefer being hauled 
before a state court instead of a tribal court.  Thus, the Arizona 
Rules had little or no opposition from Indian people.283  The 
 
279. Act of Aug. 15, 1953, ch. 505, § 4, 67 Stat. 588-90 (codified in scattered 
sections of 18 and 28 U.S.C.). 
280. From a tribal government and policy standpoint, culturally appropriate 
dispute resolution processes might not be considered “optional.” 
281. According to literature describing the tribal courts in Minnesota that was 
provided to the Minnesota Supreme Court with the petition for the recognition 
rule, the tribal court of the Bois Forte Band of Chippewa was established in 1947, 
the White Earth Band in 1978, the Mille Lacs Band in 1983, the Shakopee 
Mdewakanton Sioux Community in 1988, the Lower Sioux Indian Community in 
1993, and the Upper Sioux Indian Community in 1994.  Minnesota Petition, supra 
note 58, at 3. 
 282. Even Minnesota authorities have been corrected by the U.S. Supreme 
Court when they have attempted to overstep their bounds.  See Bryan v. Itasca 
County, Minn., 426 U.S. 373 (1976) (stating Public Law 280 does not include the 
power to tax Indian property on Indian reservations).  This has been a rare event, 
however, because state authority is fairly broad. 
 283. Telephone Interview with David Withey, supra note 154. 
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Minnesota Rule, in contrast, faced opposition from members of 
Indian tribes, in some cases apparently because they were 
disgruntled litigants in tribal court disputes.284  While tribal courts 
have long been established and long been active in Arizona, they 
are generally newer in Minnesota and apparently even Indian 
people are not completely convinced of their legitimacy. 
There are other differences between the tribal courts in 
Arizona and Minnesota.  Arizona’s tribal courts are perhaps more 
well-established than the tribal courts in Minnesota.  The Navajo 
Nation alone, for example, has a population of over 180,000,285 and 
its courts handle well over 50,000 cases a year.286  The size of this 
judicial system creates different judicial dynamics.  In Arizona, the 
tribal courts are a key component of the provision of justice within 
the state.  Absent the tribal courts, the Arizona state courts might 
be forced to re-litigate thousands of cases.  Minnesota does not 
have any tribes that large,287 nor any tribal courts with dockets that 
extensive. 
Some of the opponents to the Minnesota Rule criticized tribal 
courts by noting alleged conflicts of interest because some of the 
tribal judges serve part-time as judges and part-time as attorneys in 
other tribal courts.288  The lack of a full-time tribal judicial class in 
Minnesota is both a blessing and a curse.  Judicial independence 
and authority surely benefits from a class of judges who do not 
practice as attorneys in other contexts.  Indeed, full-time judges 
attain a status of apparent impartiality that practicing lawyers can 
never fully obtain, at least while remaining in the fray as an 
advocate.  On the other hand, few of the small tribes in Minnesota 
have caseloads that warrant a full-time judiciary.  Like some state 
and even federal magistrate judges, some tribal judges serve only 
part-time.  Having a judge who also moonlights as an attorney in 
other courts is not ideal, but it reflects one advantage of part-time 
judges: many of them have formal law degrees, reflecting 
substantial formal legal training.  In contrast, many of the justices 
of the Navajo Nation Supreme Court have been lay persons. 
While discomfort with part-time judges may not be completely 
 
 284. See supra notes 230-234 and accompanying text. 
 285. U.S. Census 2000, http://www.census.gov/main/www/cen2000.html (last 
visited Nov. 2, 2004). 
 286. BUILDING COOPERATION, supra note 114, app. B. 
 287. Leech Lake, for example, has approximately 10,000 members, while Red 
Lake has about 5,000.  U.S. Census 2000, supra note 285. 
 288. Minnesota Petition Hearing, supra note 227. 
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devoid of merit, a tribe should not be forced to wait until it can 
develop a full-time case docket to begin a tribal judiciary.  If a tribe, 
in its sovereign judgment, decides to swear in part-time judges, 
those judges are clothed in the tribe’s sovereignty and their 
decisions should be respected as such. 
Unfortunately, the environment in Minnesota is such that not 
all have accepted the fundamental concept of tribal sovereignty.  
Indeed, the Minnesota Rule faced opposition from groups that are 
not focused particularly on tribal courts, but that seek to raise a far 
broader point: they question the lawful basis of tribal sovereignty.289  
In light of the long line of statutes, Supreme Court cases, and 
executive actions affirming tribal sovereignty, such claims are 
absurd.  Public Law 280, however, may have helped to create an 
environment in which such claims can be made. 
Public Law 280 should not be seen as an insurmountable 
barrier to good judicial policy on the recognition of tribal 
judgments.  Indeed, Wisconsin, another Public Law 280 state, has 
adopted a recognition rule that is highly respectful of tribal 
courts.290  Thus, while Minnesota’s approach to tribal courts has 
probably been strongly affected by Public Law 280, Minnesota’s 
agnostic approach to tribal courts was not inevitable.  Other factors 
must have been involved. 
B. The Influence of Federal and State Leadership 
In Arizona, the recognition proposal began at the state 
supreme court level and it seems to have had tremendous support 
there.291  Yet, even though the question at issue was whether the 
 
 289. See supra notes 230-237 and accompanying text. 
 290. WIS. STAT. § 806.245 (2003) (proclaiming full faith and credit for tribal 
courts, but setting forth a list of requirements that look more like comity). 
 291. Arizona’s process began at the request of the Conference of Chief 
Justices; the Arizona Supreme Court issued an administrative order for the 
establishment of Arizona’s Tribal Court/State Court Forum.  David Withey, the 
Chief Counsel for the Arizona Supreme Court, was an active participant on the 
Arizona  Court Forum from the very first meeting.   Some of the Arizona Supreme 
Court Justices themselves appear to have been more supportive of the Arizona 
Forum.  The forum’s report, for instance, contains a lengthy and glowing 
expression of gratitude to former Chief Justice Frank X. Gordon.  BUILDING 
COOPERATION, supra note 114, at 3 (stating “[h]e has, among other things, opened 
the State Court Judges’ Annual Conference and training to tribal court judges; he 
has established good working relationships with many tribal court judges; he has 
visited tribal courts; and he has actively and consistently supported the efforts of 
this Forum”).  Former Chief Justice, Stanley G. Feldman co-authored an article 
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state courts should recognize tribal court judgments and orders, 
there was a significant federal component to the initiative.  Not 
only were federal judges and officials involved in the process of 
developing the proposal within the Arizona Court Forum,292 it was 
the Ninth Circuit’s decision in Wilson v. Marchington that provided 
inspiration for the substance of the rule.293  The existence of federal 
common law and the pervasive effect of federal law in Indian 
country in Arizona undoubtedly produced a different environment 
than in Minnesota, where Public Law 280 has made state authority 
more pervasive. 
In Minnesota, leadership at the state supreme court level was 
brief.  In addition, Public Law 280 has also had the effect of de-
federalizing Indian country and removing federal officials and 
federal judges from important public policy questions related to 
tribal courts.  With greater involvement by federal officials, who 
would have been influenced presumably by strong federal policies 
favoring tribal self-determination and the pervasive notion of the 
federal government’s trust responsibility to look out for tribes in 
interactions with states, the result may have been different. 
C.  The Road Ahead 
Public Law 280 remains the law of the land.294  As long as 
Public Law 280 remains in place, tribal courts will remain, to some 
 
entitled “Resolving State-Tribal Jurisdictional Dilemmas” with David Withey in 
1995.  See Stanley G. Feldman & David L. Withey, Resolving State-Tribal Jurisdictional 
Dilemmas, 79 JUDICATURE 154 (1995).  In contrast, Minnesota’s proposal proceeded 
in almost a grassroots fashion with support coming primarily from tribal court and 
lower state court judges.  While Justice Gardebring of the Minnesota Supreme 
Court helped to establish the Minnesota Forum, she soon left the bench and the 
forum no longer enjoyed the visible support of a state supreme court justice.  
From then on, the state leadership came from Judge Robert Schumacher at the 
Court of Appeals level and from district court judges. 
 292. Minnesota seems to have exported some of the talent to Arizona that was 
involved in the development of the Arizona Rules.  Judge William C. Canby, Jr., 
born and raised in St. Paul and a graduate of the University of Minnesota Law 
School, now serves on the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit in Arizona 
and occasionally appeared at Forum meetings.  Judge Canby is an expert on 
federal Indian law.  Other federal officials, including an assistant U.S. attorney, 
were members of the Forum.  See Minnesota Petition, supra note 58, app. B. 
 293. Wilson v. Marchington, 127 F.3d 805 (9th Cir. 1997). 
 294. The state has “retroceded” some of its Public Law 280 jurisdiction on the 
Bois Forte reservation to the Band and the federal government.  B.J. Jones, 
Welcoming Tribal Courts into the Judicial Fraternity: Emerging Issues in Tribal-State and 
Tribal-Federal Court Relations, 24 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 457, 473 n.66 (1998). 
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degree, an optional forum for many disputes arising on Indian 
lands and will retain exclusive jurisdiction only for causes of action 
against the tribe.  Public Law 280 need not, however, serve as an 
obstacle to tribal court development.  As a matter of judicial 
economy, and the rational administration of justice, state courts 
should welcome the provision of justice by their brethren on tribal 
courts.  Tribal courts seek to perform the same function that state 
courts perform, that is, to provide justice to litigants in a manner 
that is consistent with the laws and values of the public they serve. 
As the volume of cases in tribal courts increase, state courts will 
have more occasions to address tribal court judgments and orders.  
Through such work, the courts may develop, through common law, 
what the Minnesota Supreme Court stopped short of 
accomplishing in the rule.  Faced with the issue in a case in which it 
must decide, the Minnesota Supreme Court may well establish a 
common law rule of comity and respect toward tribal court 
judgments.  While the issue is sure to percolate up to the state 
supreme court eventually, the exceedingly wide discretion 
contemplated by the existing rule and the unlikelihood of a 
hearing means that the record may not be developed for appellate 
review. 
If the case reaches the appellate level, there is some reason to 
believe that the substantive rule adopted will be more respectful 
toward tribes than the Minnesota Rule.  In the case of Desjarlait v. 
Desjarlait in 1985, the Minnesota Court of Appeals issued an 
opinion in which it rejected the strongest and most binding form 
of respect, full faith and credit, and seemed to suggest that it was 
inclined to approach questions of recognition of tribal court 
judgments as a matter of comity.295  As a matter of law, Desjarlait’s 
rejection of federally-mandated full faith and credit seems 
correct.296  The exact contours of the rule of comity that it sought to 
apply, however, were not delineated. 
 
 295. See Desjarlait v. Desjarlait, 379 N.W.2d 139 (Minn. Ct. App. 1986). 
 296. For a short survey of the academic debate, compare Robert N. Clinton et 
al., Dispute Resolution in Indian Country: Does Abstention Make the Heart Grow Fonder?, 
71 N.D. L. REV. 541, 554 (1995) (stating “I submit, and always have maintained, 
that tribal judgments are judgments of the territories within the meaning of the 
Full Faith and Credit Act, thereby indicating that they are entitled to the same full 
faith and credit as state judgments”) with Robert Laurence, Full Faith and Credit in 
Tribal Courts:  An Essay on Tribal Sovereignty, Cross-Boundary Reciprocity and the Unlikely 
Case of Eberhard v. Eberhard, 28 N.M. L. REV. 19 (1998) (rejecting the view that 
tribes are included within the Full Faith and Credit Act). 
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If the issue is faced directly, it would seem difficult, however, to 
justify a refusal to give any respect to a tribal court ruling.  After an 
appropriate amount of time and perhaps after district courts have 
had an opportunity to struggle with the virtually unlimited grant of 
discretion in the Minnesota Rule, the Minnesota Supreme Court 
should reconsider the issue.  At that time, it would be well within 
the mainstream of state courts nationwide if it adopted a rule that 
was cautiously respectful of tribal court decisions; it would also be 
consistent with the nascent development of common law in this 
state as represented by Desjarlait.297  Comity is the approach taken in 
Wilson v. Marchington and such a rule constitutes a sensible 
approach to these questions.298 
V. CONCLUSION 
One of the legacies of Public Law 280 is an unwarranted 
disrespect for tribal governmental institutions.  Because Indian 
tribal governments have a sovereign right to establish tribal courts, 
such disrespect is unfounded.  If tribal courts exist, they are 
required by federal law to provide many of the same protections to 
litigants that state courts must provide.  By providing these 
protections, they earn the right to be treated with respect by state 
courts. 
The Minnesota Supreme Court Rule on the Recognition and 
Enforcement of Tribal Court Orders and Judgments is a step 
forward in state-tribal relations because it provides a clear avenue 
to the recognition of tribal court judgments.  It is a very modest 
step, however.  Minnesota should consider implementing a 
stronger rule that would clearly demonstrate respect for tribal 
courts, provide more direction to state district judgments to 
promote uniform treatment of tribal rulings, and encourage 
cooperation between tribal and state courts.  
 
 
 297. 379 N.W.2d 139. 
 298. 127 F.3d 805. 
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